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Debt impacts not only our pocketbooks, but also our emotional and re-
lational well-being.1 Debt may lead to bankruptcy, homelessness, and even 
prison time.2 Furthermore, debt causes stress that may instigate domestic 
abuse, divorce, and physical illness.3 Indeed, the Department of Defense 
(“DOD”) has deemed debt a matter of national security. This is why it pre-
scribes special consumer lending protections for members of the military 
and their families.4 These protections include a 36% interest rate cap on 
small-dollar short-term consumer loans; these loans are referred to as “pay-
day loans,” because their repayment is often tied to a paycheck.5 The DOD 
deemed these special protections necessary in order to guard military 
members from the perils of payday loans’ notorious traps.6
* Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Diana Avelis, 
David Bennett, Chelsea Carr, Laura Drees, Brett Johnson, and Laura Streit for their comments and 
assistance.
1. See Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt Management in Financially 
Distressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 137-53 (Katherine 
Porter ed., 2012) (discussing stress due to financial issues, and the impact of individual’s well-being). 
2. See Molly McDonough, Payday Lenders Using Courts to Create Modern-Day Debtors’
Prisons in Missouri, Critics Say, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 20, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://www.abajournal.com 
(explaining how debtors may be arrested to answer to a civil judgment on a debt in Missouri).
3. Thorne, supra note 1, at 137-53 (discussing impacts of financial stress).
4. See U. S. Department of Defense, Report on Predatory Lending Practices Directed at Mem-
bers of the Armed Forces and Their Dependents, 5 (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf [hereinafter DOD Report on Predatory Lending] (noting 
how predatory lending harms military readiness); Relationships and Stress, MILITARY ONESOURCE,
http://www.militaryonesource.mil/search?content_id=270175 (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (directing 
means for navigating financial stress and importance with relationships).
5. This Article will refer to small-dollar short-term loans as “payday loans,” as most commenta-
tors do. However, these loans are not necessarily tied to paychecks and the amounts and terms of these 
loans and laws’ coverage vary greatly. DOD Report on Predatory Lending, supra note 4, at 1-49. See
also Charis E. Kubrin et al., Does Fringe Banking Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates?, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 437, 437-53 (2011) (exploring workings of payday loans).
6. See DOD Report on Predatory Lending, supra note 4, at 1-50 (also noting predatory market-
ing to military members).
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Payday loans operate under the radar of banking regulations and trap 
consumers in a cycle of debt from which they often cannot escape.7 These 
loans are just one example, along with title loans and rent-to-own contracts, 
of what are referred to in this Symposium and elsewhere as “fringe” finan-
cial products.  This label flows from assumptions that only a small minority 
of individuals use them on a limited basis, while most people qualify for, 
and choose, traditional financing through bank accounts or mainstream 
credit cards. In reality, however, so-called fringe financial products are 
growing in popularity, as more consumers are unbanked or ineligible for 
traditional bank loans and credit cards.8
Indeed, payday loans have moved mainstream. “[P]ayday lenders and 
check cashers outnumber McDonald’s restaurants and Wal-Mart stores in 
the United States,” and consumers of all types turn to these loans for so-
called “fast cash.”9 In theory, payday loans are meant to provide a safety 
net for individuals who need small amounts of cash to get through tempo-
rary financial setbacks.10 Although payday loans take many forms, a typi-
cal payday debtor takes out a small-dollar loan for a “fee” and obtains an 
interest-only loan that is due to be paid in full in a few weeks. The problem 
is that when the few weeks are up, the consumer is usually unable to repay 
the loan. Instead, the consumer may “roll over” or take out another loan 
and again pay interest, fees and other administrative costs. As this cycle 
continues, the consumer ends up paying in excess of 400% annually in 
hopes of merely covering these fees and other charges.11
Professor Nathalie Martin, who has extensively studied payday lend-
ing, has concluded that “the debt trap is the business plan” of these lend-
ers.12 This debt trap has raised red flags for federal regulators, including 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), which was estab-
lished under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
7. Protecting Consumers From Unreasonable Credit Rates Act of 2012, S. 3452, 112th Cong. 
§ 2(3), 2(5) (2012) (noting such findings as a basis for proposing stricter rules on payday loans).
8. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1-15 (2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/
2012_unbankedreport.pdf; Martha Perine Beard, Reaching the Unbanked and Underbanked, CENTRAL 
BANKER, Winter 2010, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/articles/?id=2039.
9. Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23, 23 
(2011).
10. Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest–Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Prac-
tices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564-77 (2010) (explaining the payday lending history and 
development, and their real-world applications in today’s economy).
11. See id. at 569-77 (explaining payday lenders’ business plan and high profits due to repeat 
borrowers).
12. Id. at 577.
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Act (“Dodd-Frank”).13 The CFPB has made payday lending awareness and 
reform a priority project and warns consumers on its consumer.gov website 
to read the fine print terms of payday loans carefully.14 It also has ex-
pressed great concern regarding the industry and aims to issue regulations 
to protect consumers from the cycle of costly debt that ensnares payday 
loan borrowers.15
When examining the industry, the CFPB is poised to consider payday 
lending’s impact on women and their children. Studies show that a dispro-
portionate percentage of payday loan borrowers are female.16 For example, 
a 2010 study reported that, on average, 64% of the visitors to 18 different 
Internet payday loan sites in November of that year were female.17 Fur-
thermore, over half of the female payday loan consumers reported having 
children seventeen years old or younger in their households. These reports 
overall suggest that a significant portion of the borrowers were single 
mothers.18
Researchers using 2007 Federal Reserve data similarly reported that a 
disproportionate number of households headed by women use payday 
loans, as compared to households headed by men or married couples.19
Studies in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Colorado also indicated a predominance 
of women among payday loan consumers in those states.20 This predomi-
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
14. Payday Loans and Cash Advances, CONSUMER.GOV, http://www.consumer.gov/ (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013). See also David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency Act of 2009 Would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, 2 
BLOOMBERG L. REP.: RISK & COMPLIANCE, Oct. 2009, at 3-4, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491117 (critiquing the CFPA Act for advocating broad applications without 
adequate evidentiary basis).
15. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PAYDAY LOANS AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS: A
WHITE PAPER OF INITIAL DATA FINDINGS, 1-43 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov
/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter CFPB WHITE PAPER].
16. See also Michael H. Anderson, An Economic Investigation of Rent-to-Own Agreements, 89 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 156 (2013) (observing the same phenomenon in rent-to-own agreements).
17. Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title 
Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 534-35, 534 n.44 (2012)
(discussing the study).
18. Id. at 535-46 (noting additional studies that indicate the prevalence of single mothers as 
among payday loan borrowers).
19. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Pan, Do Payday Lenders Target Minorities?, LIBERTY STREET 
ECON. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/02/do-payday-lenders-target-
minorities.html (finding that users of payday loans are worse off economically than non-users).
20. Martin & Longa, supra note 17, at 545-49 (noting statistics for Wisconsin, Illinois, and 
Colorado); ADM’R OF THE COLO. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (UCCC), PAYDAY LENDING 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION: JULY 2000 THROUGH DECEMBER 2009, 1-4 (rev. ed. 
2010), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/DDLASummary
2009corr.pdf (reporting predominance of women as payday loan consumers in Colorado from 2001 
through 2009).
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nance of female payday loan customers also appears internationally, with 
studies showing 25% more women than men using payday loans in Great 
Britain due, in large part, to marketing that targets women.21
The reasons why women disproportionately rely on payday loans are 
not clear. This reliance may be due, in part, to persisting wage gaps be-
tween women and men.22 In addition, studies of the subprime market show 
that men obtain more attractive mortgages than women do, and lenders 
steer minorities and women toward subprime and less-desirable loan prod-
ucts, even when they can qualify for prime mortgages.23 Women also are 
less likely than men to try to negotiate for better loans24 and traditional 
lenders often hesitate to lend to single mothers or women who have failed 
to establish their own credit histories.25 In addition, women in abusive 
relationships may end up with high loads of “coerced debt,” which may 
lead to poor credit ratings.26
Under these circumstances, women may look to payday lenders for 
quick cash requiring little to no credit checks.27 Multiple payday loans, in 
turn, may lead to cycles of debt and eventual bankruptcy. In fact, more 
women than men file for bankruptcy.28 Debt loads on women often impact 
21. Ruth Lythe, How Women Are Being Seduced into Debt by Payday Parasites: ‘Instant’ Cash 
Firms with Interest Rates as High as 16,000% are Ruining Lives, DAILY MAIL, (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:27 
AM), www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2094115/Instant-money-loans-Payday-loan-firms-ruining-
lives.html (describing advertisements airing during TV shows targeting women and payday loan web-
sites showing young women using payday loans to make them “glamorous”).
22. ELLEN YAU ET AL., COMPARING SALARIES AND WAGES OF WOMEN SHOWN ON FORMS W-2
TO THOSE OF MEN, 1969-1999, at 274, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99inw2wm.pdf (last 
updated Aug. 29, 2013) (noting wage gap).
23. See Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay Advocating Self-
Regulation of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REV. 1217, 1217-22 (2010) (compiling and 
citing research regarding discriminatory lending). The article poses the question: “Why would people 
who could qualify for prime mortgage loans end up with subprime loans?” Id. at 1217.
24. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavior-
al Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 116-20, 125-26 (2008) (discussing research 
regarding gender in negotiations). Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Differences in 
Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653, 653-77 (1999) (digesting 
research indicating gender differences in negotiation, but noting that some studies revealed no gender 
differences in negotiation outcomes).
25. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 483-502 
(2013).
26. Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Dam-
aged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 363-80 (2013) (explaining how abused women 
may become subject to coerced debt).
27. See Zoë Elizabeth Lees, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications in Payday 
Lending, 15 SCHOLAR 63, 63-65 (2012) (highlighting how payday lenders target minorities and women 
suffering tough financial times).
28. See Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double Down-and-Out: The Connection Between 
Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 785, 793-97 (2010) (noting that although the data is 
mixed depending on study design and focus, significant evidence suggests that payday loans contribute 
to debtors’ need to file for bankruptcy); Leslie E. Linfield, 2008 ANNUAL CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
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not only the debtors themselves but also their children and families. Debt 
loads also impact the charities and social services that step in to provide 
food, shelter, and healthcare for these struggling families. Furthermore, 
women tend to suffer more from financial stress than men and often worry 
about caring for their families.29 Debt may also hinder women from escap-
ing abusive situations.30
Therefore, context matters with respect to debt and establishing lend-
ing policies.31 Accordingly, the CFPB and other policymakers should in-
clude contextual analysis and consideration of the impact on women in 
their current study of the payday lending industry.32 The CFPB’s Director, 
Richard Cordray, opened the door for more nuanced analysis in noting how 
repeated use of these high-cost loans “by a certain subset of customers” can 
cause these consumers great harm.33 In addition, Dodd-Frank directs the 
CFPB and the Office of Financial Education to assist consumers in moving 
away from fringe banking products such as payday loans.34
This Article explores gender with respect to payday lending. Part II 
discusses contextual and empirical data regarding the realities of payday 
lending and highlights the predominance of women among payday loan 
users. Part III explores possible reasons why women may be drawn toward 
payday loans and further contextualizes the problems associated with pay-
day loan usage. Part IV summarizes legal mechanisms that currently regu-
DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT: AMERICAN DEBTORS IN A RECESSION 4 (INST. FOR FIN. LITERACY) (2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414337 (reporting 47.2% male versus 52.8% female debtors in 
2007 and 47.4% male versus 52.6% female debtors in 2008 filing for bankruptcy).
29. Victor Ricciardi, THE FINANCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WORRY AND WOMEN 1 (2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093351 (noting that more research is needed, 
but suggesting that women do tend to carry a disproportionate burden of worry due to finances); Do 
Men or Women Worry More?, ABCNEWS (Feb. 23, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Health/story
?id=1653218#.UcdXV5zNkYI: (discussing a study in 2006 that showed that women worry more than 
men).
30. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, MYTHS & REALITIES ABOUT THE CARD ACT
INDEPENDENT ABILITY-TO-PAY PROVISION (2012), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
credit_cards/ib_household_income_6_june_2012.pdf (noting how women are more at risk of violence 
and tied to an abusive spouse when they are unable to establish independent credit lines and histories).
31. Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the 
Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1219-21 (2004) 
(emphasizing importance of contextual analysis of fringe lending as a “powerful tool for discerning 
patterns of control, coercion, subjugation, resistance, and prosperity”).
32. See Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1249-50, 
1259-65 (1999) (exploring how contract law has mistakenly been deemed immune from male bias and 
arguing that contract law is susceptible to sexism).
33. Carter Dougherty, Payday Loans Get U.S. Consumer Bureau Scrutiny as ‘Debt Traps’,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-02-26/payday-
loans-get-scrutiny-from-consumer-bureau-as-debt-traps (discussing CFPB’s interest in regulating short 
term loans and discussion of extending its complaint system to cover these loans in 2013).
34. Hawkins, supra note 9, at 25-39.
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late discriminatory lending and payday loans, and Part V suggests rationale 
for more contextualized policymaking as well as means for reducing reli-
ance on payday loans by women and their families. Part VI thus concludes 
by calling for contextualized research and consideration of this research in 
crafting effective policies regarding payday loans.
II. PAYDAY LENDING REALITIES
Where do people turn when they need cash, have poor credit, possibly 
no bank account, and no means for feeding their families until their next 
paycheck? One option is to get a payday loan, which may be attractive due 
to accessibility, relative anonymity, and independence from credit rat-
ings.35 These short-term loans often provide a much-needed safety net for 
some borrowers. However, they also have been termed “devilishly complex 
financial undertakings” that the government must police to save consumers 
from deceptively high interest rates and fees.36 Furthermore, payday loans 
feed on borrowers’ over-optimism regarding repayment and foster a secre-
tive debt culture marked by financial embarrassment and stress.37
A. Salient Aspects of Payday Loans
Lenders advertise payday loans as small-dollar, short-term means for 
obtaining fast cash to get through a financial emergency. These lenders 
cater to consumers with little to no borrowing alternatives by offering quick 
cash without asking for the same proof of ability to repay that banks re-
quire. In contrast to typical banks and credit card companies, payday lend-
ers do not usually analyze or require information regarding a potential 
borrower’s total level of indebtedness and credit histories based on infor-
mation from Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion.38 Accordingly, these loans 
are usually offered by specialized non-bank firms, which are not subject to 
the same FDIC scrutiny as traditional banks.
As noted above, these loans are thus considered to be “fringe” finan-
cial products, operating under the radar of traditional banking rules and, 
35. See Margin Calls, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21571882-life-edges-americas-financial-mainstream-margin-calls (discussing 
the growing percentage of “unbanked” adults in the United States and their reliance on payday loans).
36. See Hawkins, supra note 9, at 62-63 (quoting Elizabeth Warren).
37. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 155-56 
(2008) (highlighting how payday lenders target vulnerable consumers with a high likelihood to roll-over 
their loans, thus, incurring high debt).
38. Guidelines for Payday Lending, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2005) (noting guidelines and best practices 
regarding payday lending).
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theoretically, only used by the relatively few individuals who prefer or 
have no choice but to use these products in lieu of mainstream bank ac-
counts and credit cards. Researchers found that payday loan users have 
average and median credit scores below 520, which is significantly lower 
than the average score of 680 in the general population.39 They also found 
that payday loan applicants with at least one open credit account are report-
ed delinquent by at least 30 days on half of their accounts.40
Furthermore, payday loans are particularly popular among consumers 
who have immediate financial needs and cannot afford to navigate a 
lengthy credit approval process. The promise of quick cash is a payday 
lender’s marketing hook. Lenders promote these loans as a one-time and 
convenient means for obtaining short-term funds without the credit approv-
al processes or ongoing debt commonly associated with credit cards.41
Lured by this hook, typically optimistic consumers expect that they will 
pay these loans off quickly and only use the loan money to alleviate imme-
diate needs and get back on their financial feet.
This optimal situation occurs very rarely. Instead, most payday loan 
borrowers use the funds for recurring expenses and continue to suffer cash 
shortfalls, even when they describe their financial situation as “good.”42
The PEW Charitable Trusts found in its recent study that only 14% of pay-
day loan or bank advance borrowers could afford to repay the debt within 
the initial term.43 Most borrowers renew or re-borrow, remain indebted for 
five months of the year, and pay more than $500 in fees over that time.44
PEW found that 60% of payday loans go to people using at least twelve 
loans per year and 97% go to people taking out three or more loans per 
year.45 The Centre for Financial Services Innovation similarly found that 
the average payday borrower takes out eleven payday loans per year.46
Payday lenders rely on this repeat business to ensure profitability.47 In 
addition, they effectively charge annual percentage rates (“APR”) upwards 
39. Neil Bhutta et al., Payday Loan Choices and Consequences 13 (Vand. U. L. Sch. L. & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 12-30, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2160947.
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: HOW BORROWERS 
CHOOSE AND REPAY PAYDAY LOANS 20-30 (2d report 2013) [hereinafter 2013 PEW REPORT].
42. See id. at 9-10 (adding focus group data indicating borrowers’ struggles to “catch up” and 
their propensity to have multiple jobs in pursuit of that goal).
43. See id. at 13-14.
44. See id. at 19-21; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO
BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY 9-14 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 PEW REPORT].
45. See 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-21.
46. See Margin Calls, supra note 35.
47. See 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 41, at 13-14 (highlighting that payday lenders’ business 
model and means for profiting relies on the assumption that most will not pay off their loans by the end 
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of 400%.48 This is not readily apparent to borrowers when they first get 
payday loans, however, because they focus on the initial fees instead of 
understanding the APRs.49 In turn, lenders do little to explain loan terms or 
clarify how fees and additional costs translate into high APRs. It is there-
fore not surprising that consumers find it difficult to compare lending prod-
ucts and to see how payday loans’ true costs compare with credit cards.50
Consumers also mistakenly perceive that payday loans will prevent 
them from over-drafting their checking accounts. Evidence shows that the 
majority of payday loan borrowers have over-drafted in the past year.51
Furthermore, 27% of survey respondents in PEW’s payday loan study re-
ported that lenders’ withdrawals from their accounts caused the over-
drafts.52 Moreover, many borrowers end up resorting to financial tactics 
such as borrowing from a friend or family member, using a tax refund, or 
using other credit products in order to repay the loans.53 This may be true 
even when borrowers could have pursued these tactics at the outset, and 
adds to the frustration borrowers feel as they become ensnared in a debt 
trap.54
Desperation and the ease of obtaining payday loans lure in consumers. 
One-third of borrowers admit that they would take a payday loan on any 
terms.55 PEW found that 59% of payday loan borrowers had maxed out 
their credit cards and 38% had been or would be turned down for a credit 
card.56 Another group of researchers similarly found that only 59% of the 
payday applicants they studied had general-purpose credit cards, and over 
78% of all payday applicants had zero credit available on credit cards.57
They also found that these payday loan applicants had more credit inquiries 
and denials relative to the general population in the time leading up to uti-
lizing payday loans. This suggested that these applicants had searched, 
date and that most borrowers will become repeat customers who continually take out more loans to 
cover initial obligations).
48. See Margin Calls, supra note 35.
49. See 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 41, at 13-27 (noting misperceptions and misunderstanding 
of the initial fee verses the interest rate over time and the additional fees one may incur by not paying 
by the initial due date).
50. See id. at 28 (noting how borrowers mistakenly believe that bank deposit advances are safer 
than payday loans).
51. See id. at 32-34.
52. See id. at 6.
53. See id. at 36-38.
54. See id. at 39-41.
55. See id. at 19-30 (citing desperation, perception, reliance, focus on fee, trust, and temptation as 
six main reasons people use payday loans that they cannot afford).
56. See id. at 31.
57. Bhutta et al., supra note 39, at 13.
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unsuccessfully, for alternative and cheaper forms of credit before utilizing 
payday loans.58
Accordingly, “payday loan applications occur when credit card lines 
are generally exhausted and when the search for credit becomes much more 
intense but is largely unsuccessful.”59 This drives borrowers to accept pay-
day lenders’ default loan structures and timelines, even when they have a 
right to opt for less expensive structure. For example, Washington state law 
gives payday loan borrowers a no-cost option to convert the loan into a 
more affordable 90- to 180-day installment loan, but only 1 in 10 borrowers 
take advantage of this option.60
The payday lending trap is not just a domestic problem; it is a far-
reaching global issue. This is especially apparent when lenders pitch high-
cost short-term loans through the Internet. For example, Wonga.com, an 
online payday lender based in the United Kingdom, has received attention 
as a growing “high-tech loan shark ‘laughing all the way to the bank.’”61
Wonga markets its payday loans as “simple, fast and convenient” and 
boasts that “[t]here are no worries about who is going to know” because 
one can apply “from the quiet of your own home.”62 Wonga also says that 
the 4,214% annual APR on its typical loans is misleading because it ex-
pects debtors to repay the loans in a month or less.63 However, most debt-
ors cannot repay in that amount of time and U.K. consumers complain that 
Wonga has preyed on them in times of financial desperation, trapping them 
in a “vicious cycle” of debt.64
58. See id. at 14.
59. Id. at 26.
60. See 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 41, at 24-26 (confirming other research indicating that 
consumers are generally inert by nature).
61. Matthew Campbell & Amy Thomson, Britain’s Wonga: Payday Lender and Proud of It,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-
07/britains-wonga-payday-lender-and-proud-of-it (highlighting Wonga’s profit growth of $18.6 to $69 
million from 2010 to 2011 and its expected debut in the United States with backing from California 
venture capitalists).
62. Loans Online, WONGA.COM, https://www.wonga.com/money/wonga-loans-online/ (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2013) (further boasting that Wonga does not rely on credit ratings or checks, but re-
quires a U.K. bank account and regular employment).
63. Jill Insley, Payday loans: the APR is sky-high, the pain is higher still, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 
2009, 4:04 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2011/dec/09/payday-loans-get-cheap-credit. See 
also High APR and US National Debt, OPENWONGA.COM (Sep. 21, 2011), http://www.openwonga.
com/news-and-views/view/sample; How Your Wonga Loan Works, WONGA.COM,
https://www.wonga.com/money/how-to-wonga/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (noting that costs go up if the 
borrower does not keep his promise and that there are additional fees if one cannot pay when the time 
expires).
64. See “Don’t Do It! Don’t Make My Mistake!”, MONEY.CO.UK, http://reviews.money.co.uk/
review/102787-dont-do-it-dont-make-my-mistake.htm (last visited Oct. 3,, 2013) (listing scathing
reviews and sad stories regarding Wonga loans).
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B. Prevalence of Female Payday Loan Borrowers
Payday loan debt is problematic for all consumers who use payday 
loans. However, evidence shows that this debt may be especially worri-
some for women, making gender relevant in payday lending debates. Tradi-
tional baseline assumptions for debate and policy-making like classical 
contract assumptions and law and economics theory have failed to properly 
address law in action, let alone gender’s role in real-world contracting.65
The reality is that individuals in the marketplace behave in various ways 
that often have little to do with traditional economic cost-benefit analysis. 
In addition, consumers usually do not have perfect information and data on 
bankruptcy filings suggests that women have fallen financially behind men. 
This impacts not only women’s finances, but also their physical and emo-
tional health—as well as that of their children and families. Contextual 
analysis of lending and debt is thus essential to help “expose the structural 
predicates to what is spoken of largely as a matter of individual failure.”66
1. National Research
Many studies suggest that women are overrepresented among payday 
loan borrowers.67 As noted above, a 2010 survey of Internet lending re-
vealed the high prevalence of female payday loan borrowers, and studies in 
various states support this result.68 The 2010 study was a follow-up to a 
similar 2008 study, but it utilized a larger sample size (2,228,799 unique 
visitors to eighteen different payday loan sites).69 The researchers with 
Online-Payday-Loans.org who conducted this study found a mean of 64% 
of the payday loan consumers were women.70 The site with the highest 
percentage of female consumers (CashOne) had 72%, while the site with 
65. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN L. REV.
1471, 1476–80, 1546–47 (1998) (discussing limits of theory and indicating hope that economists and 
lawyers would incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions).
66. See Austin, supra note 31, at 1221 (emphasizing the importance of contextual analysis of 
small-dollar lending).
67. See AMANDA LOGAN & CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, WHO BORROWS FROM PAYDAY LENDERS?
AN ANALYSIS OF NEWLY AVAILABLE DATA 1-12 (Ctr. for Am. Progress 2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/payday_lending.pdf; Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen 
E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and 
Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV.
589, 633-34 (2000).
68. See Martin & Longa, supra note 17, at 545-49 and accompanying text; Payday Loan De-
mographics Study – December 2010, ONLINE-PAYDAY-LOANS.ORG, http://www.online-payday-
loans.org/articles/demographics-december-2010 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) [hereinafter 2010 Payday 
Loan Study].
69. See 2010 Payday Loan Study, supra note 68.
70. See id.
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the lowest (DelawareFastCash) had 54%.71 Furthermore, 52% of the pay-
day loan consumers had children under age 17 in their households, suggest-
ing that at least some of these consumers are single mothers. However, 
these consumers are not necessarily poor and uneducated, as some may 
assume. Researchers found that only an average of 26% of the payday loan 
customers earned less than $30,000 per year and over 50% of consumers 
had attained college or higher levels of education.72
Furthermore, studies have indicated that roughly 60% of payday loan 
borrowers are female.73 “A typical borrower is likely to be a woman who 
earns anywhere from $18,000 to $50,000 a year.”74 Evidence also indicates 
that many of these borrowers are struggling mothers.75 Stories of payday 
lenders’ strategically targeted marketing to such borrowers prompted one 
computer programmer to launch a satirical website using “patent-pending 
Poor Finder™ technology” to locate customers who are likely to become 
repeat customers and continually pay exorbitant fees without ever satisfy-
ing their loans.76
Similarly, the Center for American Progress found in its 2009 report 
based on the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (“SCF”) that 
42% of families who borrowed from payday lenders were headed by single 
women, as compared with just 19% of households headed by single men.77
At the same time, married couples comprised 59% of non-payday loan 
users in the SCF study, versus 27% for families headed by single women. 
Only 14% of these debtors were single men, perhaps suggesting that single 
71. See id. Researchers noted that they would like to perform additional studies to investigate 
whether these demographics are representative of the number of these consumers who have access to 
the Internet and such websites. If more women are on the Internet, there may be more online female 
borrowers. Id.
72. See id. In addition, the payday loan consumers were 57% Caucasian and 30% African Ameri-
can. On average, payday loan website consumers were mostly younger or middle-aged. Id.
73. Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 2013 COLUM. L. SCH., L.
& ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES 443, at 18-19, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232954 (reporting results of his own study that comported with other stud-
ies); Allison S. Woolston, Neither Borrower Nor Lender Be: The Future of Payday Lending in Arizona,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 860-64 (2010) (also stating that 60% of payday loan borrowers are women).
74. Megan S. Knize, Payday Lending in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas: Toward Effective 
Protections for Borrowers, 69 LA. L. REV. 317, 323-35 (2009) (also noting how many such borrowers 
are not informed regarding APRs and the workings of loan products).
75. See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., THE DEBT CYCLE: USING PAYDAY LOANS TO
MAKE ENDS MEET 13 (2002); Office of State Auditor Claire McCaskill, Div. of Fin. & Regulation of 
Instant Loan Indus., Mo., Performance Audit 3 (May 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.auditor.mo.gov/press/2001-36.pdf (finding that 62% of payday loan customers are women 
with children under the age of eighteen living at home).
76. Knize, supra note 74, at 324-26.
77. LOGAN & WELLER, supra note 67, at 1-6 (also indicating that payday loan borrowers tend to 
have less education, although most had at least a high school diploma and some college or a degree).
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men tend to carry less debt overall.78 However, this study also found that 
many payday debtors are single mothers, likely seeking a way for their 
families to stay afloat. “Indeed, the payday loan industry targets single 
mothers and women on welfare, and many lenders will accept disability 
payments, child support or alimony payments, and Social Security benefits 
as collateral.”79
Still, there is some mixed research regarding the role of gender in 
payday loan usage. The PEW Charitable Trust found in its 2013 report that 
only a slight majority of payday loan borrowers were female, and it found 
that divorced men were more likely to have used payday loans than their 
female counterparts.80 PEW’s report nonetheless confirmed findings from 
other payday loan studies with respect to other demographic markers. For 
example, PEW’s report found payday loan usage 62% higher for those 
earning less than $40,000 and 82% higher for those without a four-year 
college degree. PEW also reported that usage was 57% higher for renters 
than for homeowners, 103% higher for those who were separated or di-
vorced than for those who were married, and 105% higher for African 
Americans than for other races/ethnicities.81
2. Colorado Research
The Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
(“UCCC”) recently released data from its survey of users of short-term, 
payday loans from July 2000 through December 2011.82 The Administrator 
of the UCCC, focusing on consumer contracts and loans, sought to track 
demographic trends of payday loans borrowers over the decade.83 The 
78. Id. at 5-7 (also noting that the industries own data is mixed, but has indicated that payday 
lenders are disproportionately female).
79. Katherine Houren, Achieving the American Dream in Debt? Why the USA Patriot Act Puts 
Undocumented Immigrants at Risk for Abuse by the Payday Loan Industry, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL 
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 561, 570 (2009) (citing HOWARD KARGER, SHORTCHANGED: LIFE AND DEBT IN THE 
FRINGE ECONOMY 72, 74-75 (Berrett-Koehler 2005).
80. See 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 41, at 8-15.
81. Id. at 9-13. It appears that although overall most payday loan customers are Caucasian, the 
usage rate is significantly higher for African Americans after controlling for demographics of the 
populations generally.
82. ADM’R OF THE COLO. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, COLORADO PAYDAY LENDING 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION, JULY 2000 THROUGH DECEMBER 2011 (2012),
available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/uccc/annual_reports
/Demo%20%26%20Stat%20Info%202000-2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 CO REPORT].
83. Id. at 1. See also ADM’R OF THE COLO. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, PAYDAY LENDING 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION, JULY 2000 THROUGH DECEMBER 2009 1-4 (rev. 
2010), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/DDLASummary
2009corr.pdf [hereinafter 2010 CO REPORT] (reporting predominance of women in payday loan con-
sumers in Colorado from 2001 to 2009).
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Administrator also aimed to explore whether Colorado’s 2011 enactment of 
its Deferred Deposit Loan Act (“DDLA”) governing payday loans in Colo-
rado, impacted these trends or had other effects on payday lending.84
The data showed that the average Colorado payday loan consumer 
earns $2,477 per month and takes out 2.3 payday loans from the same lend-
er over the course of a year.85 The average gross monthly income rose ap-
proximately $300 from 2001 to 2011, and the average amount borrowed 
per year rose from approximately $270 to $373 during that same time.86 In 
addition, from 2000 to 2011, the average consumer had been at his/her job 
roughly four years.87 At the same time, the average payday loan borrower’s 
age rose from thirty-four years old in 2001 to thirty-seven in 2011.88
Despite these changes in Colorado payday loan borrower de-
mographics, payday loan customers continue to be predominately wom-
en.89 In 2001, roughly 53% of borrowers were women, and that percentage 
has remained stagnant over the last decade.90 Indeed, women have out-
numbered men as payday loan consumers in Colorado despite the fact that 
men outnumber women in Colorado generally.91 The breakdown of Colo-







84. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 1; Deferred Deposit Loan Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-
3.1-101-5-3.1-123 (2011). 
85. Attorney General Announces 2011 Annual Lending Data Report, COLORADOATTORNEY
GENERAL.GOV (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2012/10/01/
attorney_general_announces_2011_annual_lending_data_report (last visited June 9, 2013) [hereinafter 
AG’s Press Release].
86. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 6, 8.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 4-6.
90. Id. at 5.
91. State and County QuickFacts, Colorado, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/08000.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 49.8% of Colo-
rado’s population was female in 2012).
92. This more particularized breakdown of the data beyond what was reported to the public was 
obtained directly from the Supervising Credit Examiner in the Colorado Attorney General’s Office. E-
mail from Mary Geesling, Supervising Credit Exam’r, Consumer Credit Unit, Colo. Attorney Gen. 
Office, to Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. (Oct. 11, 2012) (on file with 
author).








At the same time, single consumers continue to outnumber married 
consumers among payday loan consumers in Colorado.93 In 2001, 55% of 
payday loan borrowers were single and in 2011, that number jumped to just 
over 65%.94 It would not be surprising to learn that a high percentage of the 
single borrowers are single mothers, but that data is unavailable because 
the Administrator of the UCCC did not gather statistics on whether payday 
loan consumers have children.
III. POSSIBLE REASONS WHY WOMEN USE PAYDAY LOANS
A. Lower Salaries
Despite advances women have made in the workplace, the gender gap 
in salaries has not dissipated.95 Researchers have found that in the United 
States, women earn roughly three-fourths the amount that men earn and 
women hold only 2.5% of the five highest-paid company positions.96
Women usually enter the workforce earning less than their male counter-
parts and the salary differentials persist as they proceed through their ca-
reers.97
This may partly be due to women’s personal choices, but that is not 
the whole story. For example, the American Association of University 
Women (“AAUW”) reported in 2012 that women earned only 82% as 
much as their male counterparts one year after college graduation, and only 
93. Id. See also 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 5.
94. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 5.
95. See Susan W. Coleman & Dorothy E. Weaver, Women and Negotiation: Tips from the Field,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2012, at 12, 13-18 (discussing gender imbalances).
96. Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a 
Large Scale Natural Field Experiment, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Nov. 2012, Working Paper 
18511, at 1, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18511 (also noting research indicating that 
women are less likely than men to negotiate for higher salaries).
97. See Jeffrey A. Flory et al., Do Competitive Work Places Deter Female Workers? A Large-
Scale Natural Field Experiment on Gender Differences in Job-Entry Decisions, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES., Nov. 2010, Working Paper 16546, at 1-30, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16546 (discussing salary gaps and a large scale field experiment).
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69% as much as men ten years after graduation.98 Furthermore, women’s 
choices, such as pursuing lower-paying careers like teaching, could not 
account for a 7% difference in pay one year after graduation or a 12% dif-
ference ten years later.99 “Considerable evidence suggests that women have 
less access to organizational resources such as pay, promotion, and status 
than men.”100
Nonetheless, it is true that parenthood and competitive environments 
may negatively burden women’s resources. Mothers are more likely than 
fathers to leave or limit their jobs when they have children. Furthermore, 
mothers often encounter penalties such as reduced salaries that fathers do 
not encounter.101 Women may also be less inclined to seek jobs in competi-
tive environments, which often pay higher salaries.102 Field experiments 
have suggested that women prefer jobs with concrete rules for wage deter-
mination in which there is less expectation that one must negotiate for ad-
vancement.103
Furthermore, the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act failed in June 2012 
to the dismay of women’s advocacy groups, including the AAUW.104 The 
Act would have helped close loopholes left by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act (“Fairness Act”), which President Obama signed into law in 2009. The 
Paycheck Fairness Act would have shifted the burden to require employers 
to justify differences in pay based on qualifications, education, and other 
objective criteria unrelated to gender.105 It also would have prohibited em-
ployers from retaliating against employees who discuss wages in response 
to a complaint or investigation. Finally, the Paycheck Fairness Act would 
have also subjected employers to compensatory or punitive damages for 
statutory violations.106
98. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 8 (2013), 
available at http://www.aauw.org/resource/the-simple-truth-about-the-gender-pay-gap/ [hereinafter 
AAUW REPORT].
99. Id. at 8.
100. See Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 24, at 668-75 (discussing gender gap in salaries and 
status in the workplace).
101. AAUW REPORT, supra note 98, at 9.
102. See Flory et al., supra note 97, at 14-30 (discussing study results).
103. See Leibbrandt & List, supra note 96, at 2-13 (discussing field experiment and findings, and 
suggesting that less face-to-face interaction in the modern economy may benefit women in negotia-
tions).
104. AAUW REPORT, supra note 98, at 2, 21.
105. See Janet Hook, Wage-Bias Bill Killed by GOP Opposition, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120605-710409.html; Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate 
Republicans Again Block Pay Equity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-pay-equity-bill.html.
106. See Hook, supra note 105. See also NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., HOW THE PAYCHECK 
FAIRNESS ACT WILL STRENGTHEN THE EQUAL PAY ACT (2012), available at
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Such discussion of wage differentials among men and women may 
seem unnecessary in an article regarding payday lending. Ignoring the gen-
der wage gap, however, overlooks the collision of context that lead indi-
viduals to seek payday loans. Lower pay means fewer resources for paying 
bills and qualifying for traditional and reasonable rate loans. Employment 
and ability to pay are chief considerations in determining whether to lend 
and at what interest rate. Individuals unable to obtain reasonably priced 
loans are those most likely to turn to payday loans to stay financially afloat. 
Wage gaps therefore must be considered among factors driving more wom-
en than men into the payday loan market.
B. Debt Loads and Lack of Alternatives
Fringe banking—using financial products such as payday loans and 
other products discussed in this Symposium—has expanded significantly in 
the last five years alone. This is mainly because those with poor or limited 
credit histories and limited financial means have been cut out of traditional 
banking and have been unable to obtain mainstream credit cards in the 
wake of the economic downturn and tighter restrictions on the extension of 
credit.107 Historically, the poor had safer borrowing options to the extent 
that lending was based more on familial relationships, connections within a 
community, and local services than on rigid standards.108 However, bank-
ing law and market forces have out-powered deals done with handshakes, 
giving way to the market for payday loans and other fringe products that 
come with high costs and fail to assist individuals in building credit histo-
ries.109
Credit cards are the most common means for consumers to borrow 
money for everyday purchases and build credit histories that may assist 
them in securing further credit and insurance at reasonable rates. Credit 
cards can plague many consumers with high debt loads and interest rates in 
the double digits, but at least prevailing usury laws cap these rates and pre-
clude the type of triple-digit APRs that are common for payday loans. 
However, as noted above, it may be more difficult for women to obtain 
credit cards due to lower salaries. They may, therefore, be compelled to 
turn to payday loans to obtain needed cash without the financial checks 
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/broadpaycheckfairnessfactsheet.pdf (providing facts about 
the proposal before its failure in the Senate).
107. Baradaran, supra note 25, at 483-502.
108. Id. at 495-503. 
109. Id. at 485-505.
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required for credit cards.110 Desperation often drives individuals to turn to 
payday loans for quick cash at any cost.111
Notably, women who work inside the home or lack sufficient inde-
pendent credit histories may have particular difficulties qualifying for a 
reasonably priced credit card. For example, some have criticized the Feder-
al Reserve’s “ability to pay” ruling, pursuant to the Credit Card Accounta-
bility, Responsibility and Disclosure (“CARD”) Act of 2009, for severely 
restricting women’s access to credit. The seemingly neutral rule that be-
came effective on October 1, 2011, prevents credit card issuers from con-
tinuing to consider household income when assessing creditworthiness. 
Instead, issuers must focus only on an individual’s “independent ability” to 
repay a loan.112
In theory, these regulations can be beneficial in preventing consumers 
from accumulating debt they cannot repay. In reality, however, the “ability 
to pay” rule creates “a serious risk for women in abusive domestic partner-
ships” who usually do not own joint accounts with their partners and need 
to build credit histories to forge a path out of their abusive relationships.113
Furthermore, these new rules may hinder stay-at-home mothers who lack 
independent credit histories because they too may not be joint owners of 
their partners’ accounts.114 Repercussions of the regulations may effective-
ly preclude these women from establishing independent credit, which is 
necessary for not only obtaining credit cards and other loans, but also rent-
ing cars, making online or in-flight purchases, and accessing housing and 
beneficial insurance rates.115 This is why the CFPB has proposed to reverse 
this rule.116
110. Payday loan borrowers “generally have cash flow difficulties, and few, if any, lower-cost 
borrowing alternatives.” Guidelines for Payday Lending, supra note 38 (noting guidelines and best 
practices regarding payday lending; also citing the following resources: January 31, 2001, interagency 
Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (FIL 9-2001) (2001 Subprime Guidance); January 
24, 2000, Subprime Lending Examination Procedures (RD Memo No. 00-004); March 4, 1999, Inter-
agency Guidelines on Subprime Lending (FIL-20-99); and May 2, 1997, Risks Associated with Sub-
prime Lending (FIL-44-97)).
111. Bhutta et al., supra note 39, at 26.
112. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1736 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666j); Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.51(a) (2011); DIVISION OF CONSUMER AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
BOARD, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, at § 226.51(a) (78 Fed. Reg. 61990, current through Oct. 10, 2013).
113. Martin Merzer, Fed Rule Limits Credit Cards for Stay-at-Home Parents, CREDITCARDS.COM 
(Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/stay-at-home-parent-credit-cards-
household-income-1282.php (highlighting criticisms of the new regulations).
114. Note that the regulation could harm any partner or spouse—male or female—who is without 
significant outside income or the credit history necessary for building a credit score.
115. Merzer, supra note 113.
116. On October 17, 2012, the CFPB proposed a rule to change 12 CFR 1026.51 of Regulation Z.
Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. 1026.51 (proposed Oct. 17, 2012), available at
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Lenders also may be at fault for steering women toward smaller and 
less financially attractive business loans and mortgages than their male 
counterparts. Study data indicates that lenders offer smaller loans to women 
despite evidence that women are often more reliable than men in repaying 
loans.117 The National Community Reinvestment Coalition found in a 2003 
field test that lenders treated black testers, especially black female testers, 
less favorably than white testers, although the black testers had better credit 
profiles.118 The research left the author asking: “Why would people who 
could qualify for prime mortgage loans end up with subprime loans?”119
Likewise, a 2006 Consumer Federation of American (“CFA”) study 
concluded that lenders were five times more likely to saddle upper-income 
black women than upper-income white men with a subprime mortgage.120
This confirmed the CFA’s 2005 study results revealing that 32% of women 
borrowers received subprime loans versus 24% of male borrowers.121
Women also may bear greater student debt loads than men. Among work-
ers in 2004 aged twenty-five to thirty-four, 23% of women with bachelor’s 
degrees spent over 10% of their earnings repaying student loans as com-
pared with 16% of men.122
C. Relational Reasons and Targeted Marketing
Cultural and relational concerns also impact negotiations and wom-
en’s propensity to end up with less-advantageous financial contracts, like 
payday loans.123 In the typical patriarchal culture in which men tend to 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_CARD-Act-proposed-rule.pdf. See also Truth in 
Lending (Regulation Z), FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/11/07/2012-
26008/truth-in-lending-regulation-z (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
117. Isabelle Agier & Ariane Szafarz, Credit to Women Entrepreneurs: The Curse of the Trustwor-
thier Sex, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 1-24 (Feb. 18, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718574
(concluding from a study of the Brazilian microfinance institution Vivacred that men often reap greater 
financial benefit than women from relationships with lenders).
118. See Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay Advocating Self-
Regulation of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REV. 1217, 1217-22 (2010) (compiling re-
search regarding discriminatory lending).
119. Id. at 1217.
120. John Sarto, The Disproportionate Representation of Women in Subprime Lending: Cause, 
Effect, and Remedies, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 337, 342-53 (2011); Agier & Szafarz, supra note 117,
at 5-23 (reporting research).
121. Sarto, supra note 120, at 342 (reporting the finding that of these 32% of women, 11% held 
especially high-cost subprime mortgages versus only 7.7% of men).
122. See Jeremy M. Simon, Young Women Suffer From Greater Debt, CREDIT CARDS.COM (Oct. 
17, 2006), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/young-women-suffer-from-greater-debt.php 
(discussing research on gender and debt).
123. See Uri Gneezy et al., Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from Matrilineal and a 
Patriarchal Society, 77 THE Econometric Soc’y 1637, 1637-1664 (2009) (noting importance of culture 
in comparing negotiations in two distinct societies).
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hold the power, society hinders women from competing or negotiating.124
Most women therefore grow up in cultures in which they are expected to 
manage relationships, and place the needs of others above their personal 
needs.125 Consequently, women may seek to maintain relationships and 
care for their families above all else in negotiations.126 Furthermore, wom-
en may miss opportunities to negotiate due to lower expectations, confi-
dence, and comparison standards than men enjoy. These forces may 
contribute to women accepting less-attractive loan contracts without ques-
tioning the terms or seeking better alternatives.127
Psychological and behavioral research also suggests that negotiations 
generally may be considered more appropriate for men, and 
“[s]tereotypically masculine traits (strong, dominant, assertive, and ration-
al) are seen as more important for negotiation success than stereotypical 
feminine traits (weak, submissive, intuitive, and emotional).”128 Women 
then may reach less favorable results in negotiations than men because they 
usually employ less assertive styles, while opponents may devalue wom-
en’s often-cooperative communications.129 Biases and social inequalities 
also may cause women to subconsciously assume lower status positions in 
their negotiations, contributing to less advantageous deals for women.130
Although this may have minimal effect in any single transaction, the cumu-
lative impact can lead to significantly lower financial outcomes for women 
versus men.131
The Internet can therefore be an equalizing factor to the extent that it 
allows women to break free from their tendencies to be less competitive in 
face-to-face negotiations “due to social roles that prescribe women to be 
affiliative or relationship oriented.”132 Women may feel less constrained by 
social norms and expectations when communicating online.133 According-
124. Id. at 1647-59 (detailing a study comparing competiveness of a matriarchal versus a patriar-
chal society and finding men significantly more competitive than women in the patriarchal but not 
matriarchal society).
125. Id. at 1655-57. See also Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 24, at 653-67 (discussing gender 
differences in expectations and values in negotiations and some mixed results regarding these differ-
ences).
126. See Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 24, at 653-63.
127. See id. at 653-57 (discussing factors leading to less advantageous deals for women then men).
128. Alice F. Stuhlmacher et al., Gender Differences in Virtual Negotiation: Theory and Research,
57 SEX ROLES 329, 331. (2007).
129. Id. at 332.
130. Id. at 332-33.
131. Id. at 335-337.
132. Id. at 336.
133. Id. at 335-37 (discussing study results showing that women were significantly more hostile in 
virtual than face-to-face negotiations).
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ly, online negotiations allow women more freedom to ignore social pres-
sures and expectations in order to achieve better results. This may help 
explain why women achieve higher profits and better results in virtual, 
rather than face-to-face, negotiations.134
On the other hand, the anonymity of the Internet may help online pay-
day lenders lure women to their high-cost lending products. Women in 
need of funds may be especially attracted to online payday loans because 
computer-mediated communications save them the embarrassment of hav-
ing to discuss their debt or assets in person and protects them from shame 
of being rejected face-to-face if a loan falls through.135 One study found 
that women are 13% more likely than men to lie about their borrowing 
behavior and suffer embarrassment when discussing debt face-to-face be-
cause the social stigma behind borrowing is more negative for women than 
men.136
Face-to-face and online lenders also appear to use a variety of means 
to market loans to women. For example, anecdotal evidence from Google 
Maps suggests that payday lenders are often clustered near nail salons, 
beauty parlors, and similar female-oriented businesses.137 Furthermore, 
lenders bank on their ability to draw in customers by marketing on social 
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, which women visit more fre-
quently than men.138 One technology-oriented website reported that “wom-
en rule social media” based on the data from various social media 
websites.139
These factors may help explain why 72% of CashOne’s payday loan 
customers are female.140 CashOne’s website showcases a female payday 
loan representative smiling above the “member login” box, which may lure 
women who seek familiarity of working with another woman.141 In addi-
134. Id. at 336 (discussing the study and findings).
135. Alan D. Smith & William T. Rupp, E-Lending: Foundations of Financial and Consumer 
Marketing in an Information Intensive Society, J. E-BUS. & INFO. TECH, Fall 2002, at 5, 8, available at 
http://www.csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/jebit/volume3.pdf#page=5.
136. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Lying About Borrowing, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 510, 515, 
518 (2008).
137. See Memorandum from David Bennett to author, “Payday Lenders and Nail Salons: Anecdo-
tal Evidence from Google Maps,” and the attached maps (Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with author) (showing 
an anecdotal evidence for payday lenders clustering around female oriented businesses).
138. See Report: Social Network Demographics in 2012, PINGDOM (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/08/21/report-social-network-demographics-in-2012/ (stating that 60% 
of Facebook and Twitter users are female).
139. Id. (stating that more than two thirds of the sites in the survey had more female than male 
users).
140. Payday Loan Demographics Study – December 2010, ONLINE-PAYDAY-LOANS.ORG,
http://www.online-payday-loans.org/articles/demographics-december-2010/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
141. See CASHONE, http://www.cashone.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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tion, the website depicts more female than male borrowers, and two of the 
three testimonials listed are women, which also may increase women’s 
comfort in purchasing CashOne products.142 CashOne’s blog also seems 
geared toward women. Blog entries discuss payday loans for shopping, 
raising children, and caring for the elderly.143 CashOne’s marketing on
Twitter similarly covers these topics, while also targeting younger consum-
ers.144 Its presence on Facebook is not quite as female oriented but none-
theless, may capture women due to the large number of women on 
Facebook. Additionally, the Facebook page provides links to shopping 
websites to buy wedding and prom dresses.145
These various factors combine with women’s need to provide for their 
families, which they increasingly must do as the head of the household or 
main breadwinner.146 Still, all women are by no means the same and these 
suggestions admittedly encase stereotypes, which may or may not hold 
true. Further study is needed to test these theories. Still, the research overall 
continues to highlight the need for contextual consideration in payday lend-
ing policymaking.147
IV. LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF PAYDAY LENDING
The law has done little to address contextual realities regarding pay-
day loans, let alone data suggesting that these loans disproportionately 
burden women.148 General contract law seeks to limit intrusion on freedom 
of contract or consideration of context.149 Additionally, discrimination laws 
are largely ineffective in combatting more subtle discrimination via stereo-
typing that impacts payday lending practices.150 Furthermore, federal bank-
ing law limits the extent to which states can regulate payday loans, and 
142. Testimonials, CASHONE, http://www.cashone.com/testimonials.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
143. Blog, CASHONE, http://cashone.com/blog/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
144. CashOne-Payday-Loans, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/paydayloanutah (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013).
145. CashOne, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/CashOnePaydayLoans (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013).
146. See Thorne, supra note 1, at 141-57 (highlighting how debt hits women harder than it hits 
men because women often take responsibility for paying bills and managing debt).
147. I admit that some of this is presumptuous, but I raise the issues to highlight the importance of 
context and need for further empirical study on the role of gender with respect to debt.
148. See Hawkins, supra note 9, at 23-25 (noting that federal law has done little to regulate fringe 
lending, but Dodd-Frank opens the door for new federal regulations).
149. Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements’ Contract/No-Contract Conundrum with 
Good Faith, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 55, 57-69 (2006) (discussing classical theory and highlighting how it 
overlooks the “messiness” of real world contracting).
150. Amy J. Schmitz, Sex Matters: Considering Gender in Consumer Contracts, 19 CARDOZO J. L.
& GENDER 437, 460-70 (2013) (discussing limits of discrimination laws and classical contract theories).
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state laws create conflicts and confusion because of states’ varied ap-
proaches toward payday lenders. Moreover, it is very difficult for regula-
tors to police online lenders and lenders affiliated with Native American 
tribes who benefit from sovereign immunity.
A. Legal Restraint in Regulating Lending
1. Classical Contract Assumptions
Classical contract law aims to preserve freedom of contract and ensure 
promise enforcement in a presumably competitive market.151 Furthermore, 
it is founded on objective theory, which presumes that purchasers, sellers, 
and decision-makers are rational actors with requisite information and bar-
gaining power to make well-informed decisions.152 Classical law’s theoret-
ically neutral actors are somehow immune from perceptions and biases and, 
are therefore, blind to sexism, stereotypes, and behavioral propensities that 
defy what may appear objectively “rational” based on economic 
cost/benefit analyses.153 Classical law thus seeks to avoid interference with 
freedom of contract, even with respect to business-to-consumer, or “B2C” 
contracts, which businesses present to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Most courts and legislators adhere to these classical notions.
Furthermore, economists who argue that the free market will promote 
efficiency have persuaded these courts and legislators. Law and economics 
theorists emphasize how strict enforcement of contracts and legislative 
restraint are necessary for optimal distribution of resources through market 
competition.154 They argue that legislative regulation of contract terms or 
other intrusions on freedom of contract increases costs for enterprises and 
harms consumers through higher prices and lower quality goods and ser-
vices.155 Some scholars add that standardization of contracts benefits all 
consumers regardless of the contracts’ adhesive nature because it lowers 
transaction costs and fosters production overall.156
At the same time, many subscribe to the notion that consumers remain 
free to reject payday loans and bear responsibility for their failures to shop 
151. See Threedy, supra note 32, at 1260 (noting this is fundamental).
152. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 208-13 (2006) 
(discussing objective theory of classical legal thought).
153. See id. at 208-212.
154. See id. at 208-13 (noting the efficiency basis for the objective versus subjective approaches).
155. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 
(1975) (discussing strict enforcement under classical contract doctrine); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002).
156. See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403-04, 1433-51 (2009).
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for or negotiate their loan contracts. Courts and commentators then down-
play harm of discriminatory contractual behavior, and remain blind to con-
text and subtle discrimination.157 “Free market” supporters propose that the 
market will cure any discriminatory contracting. They posit that sellers will 
remain blind to biases as they compete for customers, and this will eventu-
ally squeeze any discriminatory businesses out of the market.158 This again 
assumes that sellers and buyers are economically rational actors.
In reality, however, payday lenders seeking to maximize their profits 
have incentive to charge high fees and costs because the consumers pur-
chasing these loans are desperate to obtain cash regardless of cost. They 
also usually lack the resources to “shop around,” and thereby persuade 
lenders to compete for business and abide by fairness norms. Of course, 
courts should continue to primarily enforce voluntary agreements. Howev-
er, courts should not overlook the importance of biases, stereotypes, socie-
tal norms, and behavioral propensities that may affect contracts in the real 
world. It remains true that the real world is marked with “messiness” that 
impacts all aspects of life—including contracting and debt.159
2. Limited Regulation of Discriminatory Lending
The United States Constitution precludes state laws that discriminate 
against women and minorities,160 and constitutional equal protection con-
straints quash quotas or other state action that provides racial minorities or 
women with special rights.161 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
157. Hila Keren, “We Insist! Freedom Now”: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything Constitu-
tional to Say?, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 133-41, 154-56 (2005) (emphasizing how contract law has 
ignored discrimination).
158. Id. at 156-58 (discussing market-oriented hostility toward regulating contracts).
159. See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The 
Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1169-70 (2006) (advancing “new legal realism” geared to
move us toward the “living law”).
160. John A. Ward III, Husband and Wife–Contracts–Married Woman Not Liable on Mercantile 
or Trading Contract Unless Disability of Coverture Removed–Wyner v. Express Publishing Co., 288 
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.–San Antonio 1956, error ref’d n.r.e.), 34 TEX. L. REV. 1094, 1094-96 
(1956) (highlighting courts’ applications of covertures statutes directing that a married woman cannot 
enter binding contracts). It was not until 1981, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court finally held that 
laws allowing a husband to sell or encumber marital property without a wife’s consent were unconstitu-
tional. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
161. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (finding Richmond’s requirement that its prime contractors 
subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses was un-
constitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to rectify past discrimination in the construction 
industry). Such action will only survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding a law school’s
use of race in admissions decisions because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in 
obtaining a diverse student body); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (uphold-
ing a Washington state minimum wage law for women due to documented evidence) (“[E]xploitation of 
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(“ECOA”) prohibits creditors from discriminating against an applicant with 
respect to any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of sex or marital 
status.162 Although the ECOA ostensibly does not apply to basic check 
cashing, it usually applies to payday loans offered by banks.163 It precludes 
these banks from offering substantially different interest rates or pricing 
structures for these products and aims to stop lenders from targeting or 
discouraging applications from protected groups.164 Specifically, lenders 
may not evaluate applications on a prohibited basis or discriminate against 
applicants because their income comes from a part-time job, alimony, child 
support, veterans’ assistance, or other public assistance.165 Lenders must 
also notify applicants of adverse actions taken in connection with an appli-
cation for credit in an accurate and timely manner.166
Furthermore, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Missouri, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma have 
state statutes prohibiting discrimination in consumer credit transactions on 
the basis of sex or marital status.167 California bars gender discrimination 
in credit contracts and letters of credit, as well as other documents.168 Ken-
tucky has a general statute that prohibits gender discrimination in financial 
practices.169
However, the ECOA and state discrimination laws are largely ineffec-
tive in addressing gender gaps in payday loan burdens because they gener-
ally target only clear disparate treatment and other overt and well-
documented discrimination.170 For example, a plaintiff may survive a mo-
tion to dismiss where she proves that a creditor used gender-based epithets 
a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus rela-
tively defenseless against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well 
being, but casts a direct burden for their support upon the community.”).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2006).
163. ALYS COHEN ET AL., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, 10-22 (Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. 2009).
164. See id. at 13-51 (discussing discrimination laws applicable to lending); Guidelines for Payday 
Lending, supra note 38 (noting guidelines and best practices regarding payday lending).
165. COHEN ET AL., supra note 163, at 20-55.
166. Id. at 130-148 (noting that creditors also may not consider likelihood to have children).
167. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(4) (1995) (consumers have the “right to engage in credit 
and other contractual transactions without discrimination”); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1747.80, 1747.51 
(West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3-210 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-65-46a-66 (2003); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-1–7-6-2 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 408.550 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598B.010–
598B.180 (2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (McKinney 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-17 (2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 1-109 (1979).
168. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51–53 (West 2012); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1747–1748.95 (West 2012); 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ § 1750–1784 (West 1971). See also CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900-12906 (West 
2013).
169. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.370 (West 2011).
170. See Schmitz, supra note 150, at 160-70 (noting limits of discrimination laws).
2014] CONSIDERING GENDER IN PAYDAY LENDING POLICY 89
in threatening to increase a debt.171 However, even claimants who were 
disparately treated often face difficulty obtaining concrete evidence to 
prove their allegations.172 It is particularly difficult for claimants to over-
come lenders’ reliance on “discretionary pricing” as justification for more 
subtle discrimination.173 This is augmented by credit scoring to the extent 
that women and minorities may have lower scores due to the snowball ef-
fect from historical underrepresentation of these groups in the pool of past 
credit recipients.174
Furthermore, disparate impact cases place a tough burden on claim-
ants to: (1) establish that the defendant employed a specific policy or prac-
tice in order to discriminate and (2) demonstrate with statistical data that 
the policy or practice had a demonstrable adverse effect on the claim-
ants.175 Borrowers have launched cases against lenders that improperly 
target racial minority communities in marketing overpriced loans, which is 
often referred to as “reverse redlining.” However, these actions are difficult 
for plaintiffs and their attorneys to recognize or learn about because they do 
not easily have access to companies’ internal documents or marketing 
strategies.176
171. Sharp v. Chartwell Fin. Servs. Ltd., No. 99 C 3828, 2000 WL 283095, at *2-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
6, 2000) (finding plaintiffs survived the creditor’s motion to dismiss on their ECOA and FDCPA claims 
where they had specific evidence of harassing threats with gender-based and racial epithets).
172. In addition, women may be able to use the FDPA to recover against debt collectors who 
harass them with threats against their children or negative comments about their marriages and capacity 
to raise children. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Check Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 162-64 (3d Cir. 
2007) (affirming injunction and fines against a company that told female debtors that their children 
would see them “being taken away in handcuffs,” and “be bringing their mommy care packages in 
prison.”); Black v. Aegis Consumer Funding Grp., Inc., No. CIV. A. 99–0412–P–S, 2001 WL 228062, 
at *2-9 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2001) (awarding damages under the FDCPA where the collectors told a 
mother that they would take her “kids’ clothing,” and hounded her about whether her marriage was the 
reason she was not paying her debts); Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 865-75 (D. 
N.C. 1981) (awarding plaintiff damages under the FDCPA where a collector told her that she “shouldn’t
have children” due to her hospital debt).
173. See Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimina-
tion, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 375-76, 386-88, 433 (2010) (discuss-
ing difficulty of proving discrimination in mortgage cases, and the role of “discretionary pricing”).
174. COHEN ET AL., supra note 163, at 133-43.
175. See Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 
FLA. L. REV. 251, 256-57, 297-98 (2011) (noting the difficult burden to bring a disparate impact case 
and stating that it is “very rare for plaintiffs [in disparate impact cases] other than highly sophisticated 
and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail under Title VII [in the 
employment context.]”).
176. See Andrew Lichtenstein, United We Stand, Disparate We Fall: Putting Individual Victims of 
Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (2010) (discussing 
reverse redlining claims); Pouya Bavafa, The Intentional Targeting Test: A Necessary Alternative to the 
Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact Analyses in Property Rentals Discrimination, 43 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 491, 496 (2010) (discussing difficulty establishing discrimination).
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Moreover, it is an arduous uphill battle to prove that a payday lender 
is marketing to minorities, and even more so with respect to women.177
Lenders can easily explain away the statistics regarding minorities’ or 
women’s overrepresentation among payday loan borrowers.  They may 
claim it is merely “coincidence” or simply due to consumers’ purchasing 
choices.
Some have also argued that the disparate impact standard is not ap-
propriate in these cases. With respect to Title VIII claims under the Fair 
Housing Act, for example, some refute disparate impact arguments because 
they do not require intent, and thus may punish well-meaning compa-
nies.178 Similarly, economist Paul Rubin stated:
It scares me because if this theory becomes widespread, if government 
looks intensely for disparate impact, looks for discrimination with no ev-
idence of behavior, simply looks for cases where there are differences, 
then someone is going to put pressure on banks to relax their underwrit-
ing standards to make loans that they might not want to make in order to 
avoid being examined.179
At the same time, general consumer lending protections like the Truth 
in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Real Estate Settlement Act (“RESPA”) 
have been criticized for disproportionately burdening women by overload-
ing consumers with disclosures.180 TILA requires lenders to disclose key 
information such as fees and interest rates, and Regulation Z implementing 
TILA mandates that disclosures be “clear and conspicuous.” RESPA pro-
vides similar disclosure rules, which one commentator critiqued as further 
clouding women’s borrowing decisions.181 Nonetheless, most commenta-
tors and policymakers support clear and understandable disclosures. Fur-
thermore, some research suggests that women may pay more attention than 
men to disclosures in seeking to avoid risky behavior.182
Concern for women’s debt dilemmas has led some commentators to 
advocate direct gender consideration in financial reforms.183 For example, 
177. See Deval L. Patrick et al., The Role of Credit Scoring in Fair Lending Law–Panacea or 
Placebo?, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 369, 386-89 (1999) (highlighting difficulty of proving lending 
discrimination, and noting that the Department of Justice had to focus its limited resources on disparate 
treatment cases with respect to race).
178. Andrew L. Sandler et al., Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Establish Discrimination in 
Lending, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 417, 422-30 (2013).
179. Id. at 432.
180. See Sarto, supra note 120, at 349 (proposing need for gender considerations in regulating 
lending).
181. See id. at 350 (noting this critique).
182. See Mann supra note 73, at 3-6; Melanie Powell & David Ansic, Gender Differences in Risk 
Behaviour in Financial Decision-Making: An Experimental Analysis, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 605, 615 
(1997) (reporting results from experiments).
183. See Sarto, supra note 120, at 349-66 (discussing how reforms could address gender issues).
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one commentator has proposed proactive regulations to account for wom-
en’s disproportionate burdens from foreclosure, especially when they have 
families to support with no or low income.184 Nonetheless, outright regula-
tion of financial markets must be tailored to address real hurdles women 
face in contracting. Instead, a better approach may be to augment financial 
education and invest in more serious consideration of gender as an im-
portant component of context when analyzing and enforcing loan con-
tracts.185
At the same time, anti-discrimination laws and policies promoting 
gender diversity must not cross constitutional lines by creating quotas or 
other special rights for any particular group. For example, Dodd-Frank 
requires each federal agency to create an Office of Minority and Women 
Inclusion (“OMWI”) to promote “fair inclusion and utilization” of minori-
ties and women in agency business. Furthermore, the CFPB is charged 
more generally with gathering data and creating regulations to address 
“abusive” tactics that financial service providers employ to take unreasona-
ble advantage of consumers.186 Dodd-Frank also directs the CFPB to re-
search “access to fair and affordable credit for traditionally underserved 
communities” as well as effective disclosures to address consumer propen-
sities.187
The government faces budgetary constraints and administrative con-
cerns in creating education programs and lending initiatives. Government 
action requires allocation of limited public resources, and federal admin-
istration of programs within state boundaries is often plagued by inefficien-
cies and needless additional costs and confusion. Moreover, policymakers 
need more information through research regarding the existence and extent 
of gender discrimination and differences with respect to lending. There also 
are valid concerns about the design of any law or regulation that would 
address subtle gender biases and behavioral differences without reinforcing 
stereotypes. It would be counterproductive for the government to promul-
gate programs based on improper assumptions about women and men. 
Policymakers also should be careful to respect voluntary agreements.
184. See id. (highlighting need for gender considerations in lending reforms).
185. See, e.g., LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND 
THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003) (providing a manual to assist women in identifying pitfalls in their negotia-
tions and finding ways to better assert themselves).
186. See Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and Services, 127 
BANKING L.J. 722, 723-30 (2010) (discussing the authority and duties of the CFPB).
187. See Hawkins, supra note 9, at 36-38.
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B. Laws Targeting Payday Loans
The legal landscape covering payday loans is complex and confusing. 
To date, the federal government has enacted scant legislation covering 
these loans. However, Dodd-Frank now has opened the door to federal 
regulation by giving the CFPB power to study and regulate payday loans 
and other fringe lending products.188 The current lack of federal regulation 
has nonetheless left the law mainly to the states, which have adopted varied 
and incomplete regulations that leave loopholes for payday lender abuses. 
States also have had difficulty regulating payday lenders due to federal 
law’s allowance for banks to charge their home state rates to all consumers 
nationwide. Internet lending and lenders’ collaboration with sovereign 
tribes also have created difficulties for state regulators.
1. Limited Federal Restrictions and Proposals
As noted previously, the federal government has largely left regulation 
of payday loans to the states. The United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the National Bank Act (“NBA”) to allow national and state chartered 
banks and thrifts to “export” favorable laws from their home states in order 
to circumvent less-favorable laws in other states where they do business.189
This means that a bank chartered in Delaware may impose its interest rates 
on consumers in Colorado without worry about Colorado usury rate laws. 
Payday lenders use this to their advantage by affiliating with banks in states 
allowing for higher rates, and banks have started payday loan subsidiaries. 
Internet and out-of-state payday lenders seek to use the dormant commerce 
clause to challenge states’ imposition of regulations on those who lend to 
their citizens. Nonetheless, some states have been successful in enforcing 
their laws on these lenders.190
Online and other payday lenders also have partnered with tribes,
thereby allowing those lenders to avoid enforcement of state payday lend-
ing laws by using tribal sovereign immunity.191 Critics of these tribal-
affiliated payday lenders complain that the lenders charge usurious rates, 
188. See Mierzewski et al., supra note 186, at 722-31 (explaining CFPB’s duties in researching 
and proposing regulations regarding payday lending).
189. See, e.g., Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 
309-12 (1978); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989); 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (2010); 12 U.S.C. § 1785(g) (2010) 
(giving state banks and certain other lenders the same preemptive powers).
190. See Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2008) (allowing Kansas to 
enforce its lending laws against an internet lender).
191. Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are 
Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 753, 768 
(2012).
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while the lenders’ defenders claim that these partnerships may provide 
much-needed economic benefits for the tribes.192 It is unclear, however, 
whether the tribes actually enjoy these benefits. Furthermore, tribal lenders 
have used questionable litigation tactics against state attorney generals who 
have tried to curb lenders’ payday lending practices.193
In Colorado, for example, tribal-affiliated lenders have stymied en-
forcement actions. In State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance and Preferred 
Cash Loans, tribes associated with payday lenders secured dismissal based 
on sovereign immunity of the Colorado Attorney General’s enforcement 
action against the lenders for violations of state usury laws.194 In dismiss-
ing the action, the district court applied the three-factor ‘arm of the tribe’ 
test that the Colorado Supreme Court established earlier in the litigation. 
This test focused on (1) whether the tribes created the entity pursuant to 
tribal law; (2) whether the tribe owns and operates the entity; and (3) 
whether the entity’s immunity protects the policies of tribal sovereignty.195
The Attorney General argued that the lenders did not deserve protection 
because a single owner in Nevada was using the tribes for commercial pur-
poses. The court rejected that argument, however, and emphasized that 
tribes are free to work with non-native persons to further economic devel-
opment.196 Still, this litigation continues with respect to unresolved is-
sues.197
Some have thus proposed federal regulations in light of the complica-
tions for state lawmakers’ attempts to regulate payday loans. These pro-
posals have included a bill that would amend TILA so that no storefront or 
online payday lender may charge a rate of interest or a fee that exceeds 
36%.198 The bill broadly defines “fees” and “interests rates” to include 
“payments compensating creditors for cash advance fees.”199 It also gives 
individuals rights to sue lenders who violate the law, and to collect the 
192. See id. at 766-67.
193. See State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans, 205 P.3d 389, 394-403 
(Colo. App. 2008).
194. State v. Cash Advance, No. 05CV1143, at 27, 2012 WL 3113527 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb 18, 
2012).
195. Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099, 1110 (Colo. 2010).
196. Id. See also, State v. Cash Advance, No. 05CV1143, at 21, 2012 WL 3113527.
197. The State of Colorado has appealed the District Court’s order in State v. Cash Advance, No. 
05CV1143, 2012 WL 3113527.
198. S. 3452, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s
3452is/pdf/BILLS-112s3452is.pdf.
199. The bill defines what encompasses fees and interest rates as: 1) fees for extending credit; 2) 
fees born-out of default (late fees, overdraft fees, limit fees, etc.); 3) fees defined as a “finance charge;”
4) credit insurance premiums; and 5) all charges and costs for ancillary products sold in connection with 
the payday loan. Id. at § 141(b).
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greater of three times the amount of the total accrued debt associated with 
the violating transaction or $50,000.200 Violators also would be subject to 
criminal punishment, including one year in prison and a fine amounting to 
the greater of three times the amount of the total accrued debt associated 
with the transaction or $50,000.201
This proposed amendment to TILA has not yet advanced in Congress, 
and it seems doubtful that it will become law.202 TILA already tackles a 
host of disclosure requirements and other consumer protections, which 
provided plenty of fuel for lawsuits in the housing credit crisis. These law-
suits reached their peak at 159 suits in the month of May 2009, after the 
housing market collapsed.203 These lawsuits have decreased significantly 
since that time.204 However, the CFPB is poised to issue regulations that 
may go as far as the proposed bill’s strict rate cap for payday loans to all 
individuals or that could otherwise protect consumers from payday lenders’ 
abusive practices.205 Moreover, the CFPB issued a White Paper on payday 
lending in spring 2013 and indicated its interest in taking regulatory action 
to protect consumers from getting caught in the cycle of high-cost payday 
loan debt.206
Nonetheless, the federal government has gone further in protecting 
military members from perils of payday lending in the interests of national 
security. The Military Lending Act (“MLA”) sets a strict 36% rate cap with 
respect to consumer loans, including payday loans, to regular or reserve 
active duty military and their dependents.207 The MLA also prohibits lend-
ers from securing these loans with checks, electronic access to bank ac-
counts, vehicle titles, or allotment of military pay.208
200. Id. at §§ 141(h)-141(i).
201. Id. at §§ 141(i)(1)-141(i)(2).
202. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), S.3452, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.03452: (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (noting that the bill is 
in committee).
203. See Truth in Lending Federal Lawsuits Continue to Decline, TRACREPORTS,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/323/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
204. See id. (noting that the number of lawsuits has fallen by 89% to as few as 14, 25, and 16 in 
March, April, and May 2013, respectively).
205. See infra notes 221-233 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s charge).
206. CFPB WHITE PAPER, supra note 15.
207. See JEAN ANN FOX, THE MILITARY LENDING ACT FIVE YEARS LATER: IMPACT ON 
SERVICEMEMBERS, THE HIGH-COST SMALL DOLLAR LOAN MARKET, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
PREDATORY LENDING 4-6 (Consumer Federation of America 2012), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Studies.MilitaryLendingAct.5.29.12.pdf.
208. Id. at 4.
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The MLA also preserves individuals’ access to the judicial system for 
asserting claims related to their payday loans.209 This precludes lenders 
from imposing arbitration clauses on individuals through payday loan con-
tracts to prevent them from suing the lenders in court. Nonetheless, the 
MLA does not cover other forms of fringe lending, such as bank overdraft 
loans, unsecured installment loans, or rent-to-own transactions.210 Fur-
thermore, the CFPB and FTC are not empowered to enforce the MLA and 
some high-cost lenders, most notably online lenders, have found ways to 
evade the MLA.211
Reports indicate that the MLA has been largely successful in curbing 
predatory loans to active-duty service members and their dependents.212
The CFA reported a significant drop in payday loans to military persons 
five years after the MLA’s enactment, as well as an overall 70% drop in 
payday lender storefronts in California after the MLA took effect.213 None-
theless, some criticize the MLA for not covering inactive personnel, retir-
ees, or veterans, thereby often leaving young service members returning 
from Iraq and Afghanistan susceptible to predatory lending. The CFA and 
others have, therefore, urged lawmakers to extend the MLA’s coverage.214
Professor Creola Johnson argues that the MLA’s 36% interest rate cap 
should protect all individuals in order to stop payday lenders from targeting
their marketing at those most vulnerable to being caught in a debt trap re-
sulting from confusion about payday loans’ complex cost structures. Fur-
thermore, she adds that a 36% cap would not freeze needed access to credit, 
as evidenced by banks’ and credit unions’ continued willingness to offer 
short-term loans to military members even after the MLA’s enactment.215
At the same time, Congressional representatives have proposed the 
Military Savings Act (“MSA”) to extend the MLA by directing the Comp-
troller of the Currency to develop a pilot program aimed to decrease mili-
tary members’ need for payday loans by generating new financial products 
for service members and encouraging savings and wealth-creation.216
209. See William Woodward, Legal Uncertainty and Aberrant Contracts: The Choice of Law 
Clause, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 197, 211-15 (2013) (discussing the use of arbitration in fringe economy 
lending contracts).
210. Id. at 31-83.
211. Id. at 25-82 (providing detailed findings and analysis).
212. Id. at 1-25.
213. Id. at 9.
214. See Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians 
from Payday Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649, 649-51 (2012); FOX, supra note 207, at 9-25 
(adding that at the least, the MLA’s coverage should be extended to cover retirees and veterans).
215. Johnson, supra note 214, at 663-70.
216. Military Savings Act, H.R. 5946, 112th Cong. (2012).
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However, the bill does not provide specifics on these new financial prod-
ucts or how the Comptroller will accomplish the MSA’s goals.217 It instead 
leaves flexibility, and allows the Undersecretary to expand or extend the 
pilot program if such actions would “decrease the need for service mem-
bers and their families to rely on payday lenders without exacerbating cred-
it overextension.”218 The bill was last in the Subcommittee on Military 
Personnel.219
As noted above, Dodd-Frank specifically authorizes the CFPB to 
study and promulgate regulations regarding payday loans, and the CFPB 
has made clear its interest in curbing payday loans and deposit advance 
products.220 Furthermore, the CFPB is empowered to monitor fringe lend-
ers and investigate their practices. It also may restrict “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts” that are “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which [are] not reasonably avoidable by consumers” where this injury “is 
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competi-
tion.”221 Dodd-Frank defines “abusive” to include a subjective dimension 
which allows for contextual considerations that may include gender.222
This opens the door to new protections and programs such as those dis-
cussed below.223
Dodd-Frank allows for double-barrel federal/state regulation. The Act 
mandates that the CFPB must coordinate with states in regulating payday 
lenders, and preserves states’ power to provide greater protections than 
those provided by federal law. This furthers federalism by allowing states 
217. Id. at §§ 2(a)-(b). The bill also seeks to increase rate of savings among service members. Id. at
§ 2(b)(1). With respect to cash advances, it would encourage “insured depository institutions” to offer 
service members cash advances, without excess fees and high interest rates, etc. Nonetheless, the bill is 
vague regarding how the Comptroller could create this incentive. Id.
218. Id. at § 2(g).
219. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), H.R. 5946, THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR05946:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2013) (noting that the bill is in the Subcommittee on Military Personnel).
220. See Steve Cocheo, Tug of War With Banks in the Middle, ABA BANKING JOURNAL (June 1, 
2013), http://www.ababj.com/cfpb/item/3760-tug-of-war-with-banks-in-the-middle/3760-tug-of-
8/30/2013. Banking groups have resisted the CFPB’s fierce statements against deposit advances and 
have criticized the FDIC for contradicting itself by guiding banks to provide small-dollar loans based on 
simple proof of recurring income while simultaneously rebuking banks for inadequate underwriting. Id.
221. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1031, 124 Stat. 1375, 2005-2006 (2010); Dodd-Frank, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5624 (West 2012). Dodd-Frank 
includes payday lending within its references to small-dollar lending, and has expressed its concern 
with payday lending. CFPB WHITE PAPER, supra note 15.
222. See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: the Vital Role of Attorneys General after 
Dodd-Frank, 2013 LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES no. 11-02, at 19-42, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207726 (noting the ambiguity but 
proposing broad reading of the Act).
223. See infra notes 294-317 and accompanying text (discussing proposals such as expanded loans 
through the postal service and micro-financing).
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to enforce their own consumer protection laws for the benefit of their citi-
zens.224 Dodd-Frank also empowers states’ attorney generals to enforce the 
Act’s prohibitions and any rules the CFPB promulgates.225 A broad reading 
of Dodd-Frank also gives State Attorney Generals the power to investigate 
potential federal violations.226
Dodd-Frank nonetheless limits federal regulation of payday loans by 
precluding the CFPB from establishing a federal usury prohibition.227 Fur-
thermore, some have criticized Dodd-Frank as favoring large lenders over 
smaller businesses that cannot shoulder the costs of increased regulation.228
Some also note that the addition of federal regulations regarding payday 
and other non-bank lending may unnecessarily add to regulations that states 
currently impose on these lenders.229 In addition, groups have challenged 
the CFPB’s constitutionality and the appointment of its Director, Richard 
Cordray.230
At the same time, a group of Congressional Representatives intro-
duced a bill to move regulation of payday loans from the CFPB to the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of Currency (“OCC”), and allow for newly 
chartered non-depository creditors (“Credit Corporations”) to offer finan-
cial products and services such as payday loans.231 The bill would direct 
the OCC to charter these non-bank Credit Corporations to offer payday 
loans without worrying about likely CFPB regulations or adhering to 
states’ separate payday loan regulations.232 However, many have resisted 
this bill, making it unlikely to succeed.233 Yet, it evidences the pushback 
the CFPB will encounter as it seeks to regulate payday lending.
224. See Hawkins, supra note 9, at 54-56.
225. Totten, supra note 222, at13-21.
226. See id. at 19-42 (noting the ambiguity but proposing broad reading of the Act).
227. See Mierzewski et al., supra note 186, at 722-30 (noting restrictions on the CFPB’s authori-
ty).
228. See Hawkins, supra note 9, at 38-39 (noting the law’s impact).
229. Id. at 54-59 (noting interaction with state law).
230. Mike Scarcella, States, Private Plaintiffs Press Suit Against Wall Street Reform Law, THE 
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/
2013/02/states-private-plaintiffs-press-suit-against-dedd-frank.html.
231. Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011 - 2012), H.R.6139, THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR06139:@@@D&summ2=m& (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2013).
232. Consumer Credit, Access, Innovation, and Modernization Act of 2012, H.R. 6139, 112th 
Cong. §§ 3(e)(2)(G), 3(j-k) (2012) (also specifying that Credit Corporations are not subject to any state 
law affecting their ability “to provide financial products and services to underserved consumers and 
small businesses” and precluding states from discriminating against these creditors or their agents).
233. Examining Consumer Credit Access Concerns, New Products, and Federal Regulations: 
Hearing on H.R. 6139 Before H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. & Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. 7-8 (2012) 
(statement of Grovetta Gardineer, Deputy Comptroller, OCC). Policymakers and consumer advocates 
oppose this bill as allowing online and other payday lenders to create these Credit Corporations as 
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2. Colorado’s Measured Regulations
States struggle with regulating payday lending in light of federal law 
allowing banks to export their rates, and the jurisdictional complexities of 
regulating online lending and lenders affiliated with sovereign Native 
American tribes. Furthermore, the payday lending industry has wielded 
great power in state legislatures.234 That may explain why it has been re-
ported that only eighteen states and the District of Colombia have been 
proactive in outlawing high-cost payday loans.235
Colorado does not outlaw payday loans, but has been somewhat pro-
active in regulating these loans with an aim toward balancing consumers’ 
and lenders’ interests.236 Colorado’s DDLA, noted above, sets a maximum 
loan amount at $500 and adds provisions aimed to hinder consumers from 
getting trapped in the usual payday loan roll-over cycle. DDLA thus limits 
consumers to one renewal or rollover of their payday loans, and requires a 
30-day period between loans to the same consumer.237 Consumers may 
also cancel a payday loan transaction by 5:00 p.m. the next day.238 Fur-
thermore, consumers may choose to repay loans in one sum or pay the full 
amount within six months.239
DDLA also seeks to curb costs of payday loans. Accordingly, it caps 
the interest rate for these loans at 45%.240 However, that rate limit does not 
include fees and other costs, which add significantly to the effective APRs 
and true expenses that payday loan customers bear. Typical lenders collect 
interest, along with set-up fees, not exceeding 20% of the first $300 and up 
to 7.5% of amounts over $300.241 Lenders also may collect monthly 
means for evading state laws. See H.R. 6139, 112th Cong. § 3(i) (2012). “The OCC’s fundamental 
concern is that H.R. 6139 would provide special status and federal benefits to companies and third-party 
vendors that would primarily engage in offering credit products and services that the OCC has previous-
ly found to be unsafe and unsound and unfair to consumers.” Hearing on H.R. 6139, 112th Cong. 119 
(2012).
234. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1,
132 n.717 (2002) (citing and quoting other authorities); THE STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRPS. &
CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., SHOW ME THE MONEY!: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF 
PAYDAY LENDER LOBBYING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 1 (2000), available at http://www.uspirg.org/
sites/pirg/files/reports/Show_Me_The_Money_USPIRG.pdf: (emphasizing the power of the payday and 
rent-to-own industries’ lobbying efforts).
235. See Margin Calls, supra note 35.
236. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-101 to 5-3.1-123 (2010).
237. Id. at §§ 5-1.3-105-106.
238. Id. at § 5-1.3-106(2).
239. Id. at §§ 5-3.1-101-106.
240. Id. at § 5-3.1-105.
241. Id.
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maintenance fees of up to $30 after a loan remains unpaid for 30 days.242
Payday borrowers may recoup part of the fees if they pay back the debt 
early, and are not liable for additional set-up or maintenance fees if they 
renew or rollover the loan.243
DDLA seems to have had some impact on the payday lending industry 
in Colorado. The dollar amounts of payday loans in Colorado have fallen 
almost 60%, and the number of loans fell from 1,110,224 loans in 2010 to 
444,333 in 2011 after DDLA’s enactment.244 The data also indicates that 
the enactment may have contributed to the drop in the average effective 
APR from 338.90% to 191.54%.245 In addition, the average number of 
payday loans consumers have taken out per year has fallen from 8.53 loans 
to 2.3 loans.246 As expected given the six-month repayment option, the 
average loan period has risen from 18 days to 188 days.247
Nonetheless, the average contract finance charge has risen from $60 to 
$237.248 Furthermore, the average amount financed went up in 2011 to 
$373, which is higher than it had been in the previous ten years.249 There 
also has been an increase in “same-day-as-payoff” transactions, meaning 
the lender makes a new loan to a consumer on the same day the consumer 
pays their previous loan in full. This is effectively the same as a rollover or 
refinance for the consumer but allows the lender to bypass DDLA limita-
tions on rollovers. However, the demographics of payday loan borrowers 
have remained roughly constant despite the changes in the law, and women 
still outpace men in payday borrowing in Colorado.250
V. CALL FOR CONTEXTUALIZED POLICYMAKING
Policymakers would be wise to consider gender and other contextual 
factors in determining lending policy. Context matters.251 Empirical re-
242. Maintenance fees are up to $7.50 per $100 loaned with a maximum fee of $30 per month. § 5-
3.1-105. 
243. §§ 5-3.1-105-106.
244. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 1. See also Heather Draper, Payday-Loan Amounts Drop 
60 Percent in Colorado, DENVER BUSINESS JOURNAL (Oct.1, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/
denver/news/2012/10/01/payday-loan-amounts-drop-60-percent-in.html (reporting results of the study).
245. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 12-13. See also AG’s Press Release, supra note 85.
246. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 13-14. See also AG’s Press Release, supra note 85.
247. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 11.
248. See AG’s Press Release, supra note 85.
249. 2011 CO REPORT, supra note 82, at 8.
250. Id. at 5.
251. Ethan J. Lieb, What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in REVISITING 
THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 259, 
259-83 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013); Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical 
Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44
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search aids policymakers in crafting regulations to proactively perform 
their functions, instead of simply acting to “clean up” in a reactionary 
way.252 Furthermore, all exchanges, including loan contracts, have rela-
tional and social aspects that influence individuals’ choices and behav-
iors.253 This Article thus invites policymakers to consider gender among 
the many contextual factors in creating policies and programs to address 
the perils of payday lending.
A. Need for Contextual Consideration
Gender is among the contextual factors that play an important role in 
what I term “contracting culture.”254 This conception of culture builds on 
relational and behavioral theories to view exchanges in light of a wide 
range of economic and non-economic factors that impact parties’ con-
tracts.255 Loan contracts are particularly tied to contextual considerations 
due to the significance of debt with respect to not only our pocketbooks, 
but also our relationships, emotions, and health. Financial negotiations 
contribute to individuals’ “mental health, employment opportunities, pay, 
status, and a multitude of other tangible and intangible outcomes.”256
Although all women are by no means the same, female consumers’ fi-
nancial transactions may be particularly tied to non-economic contextual 
factors.257 Women may have unique interests, understandings, and styles 
with respect to borrowing money, purchasing products, and making other 
(2003), reprinted in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE 
EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 35, 35-46 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
252. Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration 
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 115-194 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitz, Legislating in the Light].
253. Fred Block, Relational Work and the Law: Recapturing the Legal Realist Critique of Market 
Fundamentalism, 40 J. L. & SOC’Y 27, 28-40 (2013).
254. Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provi-
sions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 125 (2007) [hereinafter Schmitz, Contracting Culture]. I have pro-
posed a continuum analysis of contracting cultures ranging from “intra communal” to “extra 
communal” based on parties’ relations, understandings, and values. I place contracts that businesses 
offer to consumers—business-to-consumer, or “B2C” contracts—at the extra communal end of the 
continuum due to consumers’ lack of connections or shared interests with companies that employ these 
adhesive contracts.
255. Id. See also LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY 7-8 (Carolina 
Acad. Press 2007) (noting works in this area by Professor Blake Morant); Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. 
A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder, 7 NEGOT. J. 249, 250-53 (1991) (high-
lighting the importance of considering cultural differences relating to ethnicity, nationality, race, gen-
der, and age).
256. Stuhlmacher et al., supra note 128, at 336.
257. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text (discussing women’s propensities toward 
relational contracting).
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contract decisions.258 For example, women are more likely than men to 
make financial decisions based on family and child-rearing responsibili-
ties.259
Women also report more worry about finances than men with respect 
to keeping their families afloat.260 The Consumer Federation of America 
and Visa USA found in a 2005 study that 71% of the women surveyed said 
they had worried about their personal finances in the past year, and 66% 
cited unexpected expenses as a cause for those worries.261 The study fur-
ther found that financial worry caused women to suffer health issues, in-
cluding lost sleep. Women also lost job productivity. Moreover, one-half of 
the younger women reported that they had less than $500 in emergency 
savings.262 Gender-related data thus has salience in determining policy and 
should be considered in addressing the gender gap in payday lending and 
female debt loads.263
It is also important to consider the extent of debt’s ripple effects. It is 
no surprise to say that debt causes stress, but this stress can become a doc-
umented disorder called “Money Sickness Syndrome.”264 This emotional 
disorder produces extreme anxiety about a loss of control that may impede 
every aspect of one’s health and ability to make rational decisions.265 Stud-
ies also have shown that children in families concerned with financial obli-
gations report higher levels of “perceived poor health” and college students 
report significant negative impacts from concern regarding education 
debt.266
Studies also show that access to payday loans does not usually save 
consumers from relying on public resources. Instead, the community bears 
burdens derived from short-term fringe lending.267 A researcher testing the 
effects of payday loans on food stamp participation and child support pay-
258. Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social Cognitive Analy-
sis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 203-11 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006) (noting scarcity 
of investigation regarding gender’s role in negotiating behavior).
259. Vickie L Bajtelsmit & Alexandra Bernasek, Why Do Women Invest Differently Than Men, 7 
FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING  (1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238.
260. Ricciardi, supra note 29, at 34-35 (gathering and citing other studies indicating anxiety 
regarding debt).
261. New Survey Finds Insufficient Savings for Emergencies Major Cause of Financial Worry 
Among Younger Women, PRACTICALMONEYSKILLS.COM (Apr. 27, 2005), http://www.practical
moneyskills.com/about/press/releases/042705.php.
262. Id.
263. See Kray & Babcock, supra note 258, at 203-13.
264. Ricciardi, supra note 29, at 7-10 (discussing the syndrome).
265. Id. at 7-11.
266. Id. at 11-13 (discussing studies and results).
267. Brian T. Melzer, Spillovers From Costly Credit, 2013 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CTR. FOR ECON.
STUD. No. CES-WP-11, at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235766.
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ments found that households with local access to payday loans are 20% 
more likely to use food stamps and 10% less likely to make court-ordered 
child support payments.268 Households in these areas also experienced a 
16% increase in economic hardship related to utilities, rent, and medical 
bills.269 The researcher concluded that high-cost credit has “spillover” ef-
fects on children, those adults to whom child support payments are owed, 
and taxpayers who indirectly fund such households through food stamp and 
other government assistance programs.270
This nonetheless raises questions: Does access to payday loans aug-
ment cycles of debt that lead to greater need for public assistance, or do 
payday lenders choose to locate in low-income areas where there already is 
greater need for public assistance? Either way, the data suggests that pay-
day loans do not live up to lenders’ marketing promises—these loans do 
not appear to rescue individuals from cycles of debt or poverty. Moreover, 
it may be reverse-redlining to target areas already in financial peril to sell 
high-cost and risky payday loans.
Indeed, the United States is not alone in its concerns regarding payday 
lending. At a government-sponsored summit organized by British consum-
er minister Jo Swinson, it was decided that certain limitations would have 
to be enacted to respond to payday lenders’ irresponsible practices, namely 
in terms of advertising techniques.271 The British Office of Fair Trading 
found that payday lenders “focus on speed rather than price when compet-
ing for customers,” and employ irresponsible advertising practices such as 
using cartoon characters and Facebook marketing using animals.272 They 
also use seemingly intentional misdirection, such as stating a 1,918% APR 
as “nineteen-eighteen.”273 Proposed solutions included banning these ad-
vertisements on college campuses and ensuring that advertising contains a 
“health warning” about the risks of high-cost credit compared to affordable, 
long-term alternatives.274
268. Id. at 3.
269. Id. at 13-14.
270. Id. at 7-16.
271. Rupert Jones & Hilary Osborne, Crackdown on Payday Loans Advertising, THE GUARDIAN




274. Id. See also Sam Lister, Warning Issued to Payday Loan Firms, THE YORK PRESS (July 1, 
2013), http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/uk_national_news/10517616.Warning_issued_to_payday_loan_
firms/?ref=rss (announcing that government ministers “are due to warn” payday lenders that they are 
living up to neither the spirit nor the letter of codes imposed on them to protect vulnerable consumers); 
Payday Firms ‘Fail to Keep Promises’, THE HERALD SCOTLAND (July 1, 2013), http://www.herald
scotland.com/news/home-news/payday-firms-fail-to-keep-promises.21481034 (reporting concerns 
2014] CONSIDERING GENDER IN PAYDAY LENDING POLICY 103
Accordingly, payday loan and other high-cost debt is a significant is-
sue that must be addressed. It is nonetheless unclear what precise policies 
or regulations should prevail with respect to payday loans. As discussed 
above, the current fabric of laws contains many holes and misaligned 
patches.275 Furthermore, the unconstrained nature of online payday lending 
presents additional challenges for state regulators seeking to protect their 
consumers. Jurisdictional complications also create difficulties for lenders 
who may not be able to collect from debtors in states that outlaw or severe-
ly restrict payday lending.276 Moreover, it is unclear that cutting all access 
to high-interest small-dollar loans will improve consumers’ welfare.277
B. Call for Creativity
States should be free to regulate payday loans offered by non-banks as 
a matter of federalism and states’ prerogatives to protect the health and 
safety of their people. Furthermore, state regulations have been somewhat 
successful in curbing payday lending. They also provide examples of strat-
egies that other policymakers may employ in balancing various needs and 
interests to craft sound reforms.
PEW found in its 2012 report that payday loan usage was far lower in 
states that bar payday loans or set fairly low interest rate caps on payday 
loans as compared with states with no or lax restrictions on payday lend-
ing.278 Moreover, it found that in states that restrict storefront payday lend-
ing, 95 out of 100 would-be borrowers elect not to use payday loans at 
all.279 Eighty-one percent of the payday loan borrowers in the PEW’s focus 
groups similarly reported that they would cut back on expenses if payday 
loans were not available and most said they would not turn to, or likely 
qualify for, credit cards.280
about the £2 billion industry, rollover entrapment, speed over cost, and skimping on affordability 
checks).
275. See supra Part IV and accompanying text.
276. See Mark Huffman, Consumers Turning Tables on Payday Lenders, CONSUMERAFFAIRS
(June 7, 2013), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/consumers-turning-tables-on-payday-lenders-
060713.html (reporting how consumers in states that outlaw payday loans are simply refusing to repay 
payday loans they acquire on the Internet).
277. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply 
Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 433, 461 (2010). See also Anderson, supra note 
16, at 146-47 (suggesting that the rent-to-own paradigm adds value to the lives of credit poor consum-
ers).
278. 2012 PEW REPORT, supra note 44, at 18-25.
279. Id. at 20-13.
280. Id. at 16-20.
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However the wide divergence in state regulations and the difficulties 
of regulating Internet lending suggest that the federal government should 
set a baseline for payday lending fairness to protect all consumers, regard-
less of where they reside. This is why the CFPB is poised to initiate such 
regulations in the area of payday loans.281 Furthermore, as noted above, 
some urge the federal government to establish a strict 36% rate cap for all 
payday loan consumers that would mimic MLA in place for military mem-
bers.282 The DOD found that this cap was necessary to address declines in 
job performance and welfare of military personnel who used payday loans.
One therefore may argue that such protections should extend to cover all 
consumers.283
Critics of such regulations argue that these measures would deny con-
sumers much-needed access to credit and possibly force individuals to bor-
row from loan sharks, turn to crime, or lose ability to keep their families 
afloat.284 They argue that such fringe lending products are integral to the 
social safety net, especially for those who live on the margins beyond for-
mal lending mechanisms such as those provided through standard banks.285
Critics note that payday loan borrowers are often those without access to 
traditional loans and may prefer the “cash-and-carry” nature of payday 
loans to avoid the credit checks and commitment commonly associated 
with traditional lending products. In addition, payday loan borrowers may 
seek the seeming intimacy and informality of these loans.286 Such desires 
may help explain why payday loan borrowers reported preference for in-
creased transparency and education instead of loan preclusions in PEW’s 
2013 follow-up to its 2012 payday lending report.287
281. Johnson, supra note 214, at 663-70.
282. Id. at 654-90 (arguing for extension of the MLA but noting that the CFPB may not go that far 
in its regulations); Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog Is on a Leash: Can 
the CFPB Use Its Authority to Declare Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 
CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 396-427 (2012) (proposing that the CFPB ban certain payday-loan practices, like 
usury rates on loans, balloon payments, short maturity dates, and allowing borrowers to rollover there 
loans); see also supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text (discussing proposals). 
283. Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military 
Personnel Performance, 2008 FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA., Working Paper No. 08-18, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1269414; supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text 
(discussing DOD research).
284. See Karlan & Zinman supra note 277, at 458-61 (finding in their study that “consumers who 
borrowed at 200% in [their] experiment benefited from doing so, at least relative to their outside op-
tions”); Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects 
Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 552-55 (2010).
285. See Austin, supra note 31, at 1226-40 (discussing the social safety net and various compo-
nents of the informal economy).
286. See id. at 1243-49.
287. 2013 PEW REPORT, supra note 44, at 43-45.
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Still, evidence indicates need for greater protections from perils of 
payday loans and the CFPB has the opportunity to provide needed protec-
tions. This could include disclosure requirements aimed to address con-
sumers’ misunderstanding of payday loan costs and the impacts of 
repetitive use of these loans.288 Such disclosures could be provided in a 
clear grid with numerical calculations of true costs based on a borrower’s 
initial loan amount, coupled with simple explanations of how this amount 
will increase if the borrower rolls over the loan at the end of the initial 
term.289 Additionally, Professor Christopher Peterson highlighted consum-
ers’ unrealistic optimism, underestimation of long-term drawbacks, and 
distorted understanding of “quick-fix” loans in proposing a model ordi-
nance mandating that any lender who charges interest rates exceeding 45%
must post signs warning the public that it is a “Predatory Lender.”290
The CFPB also may look to how states such as Colorado aim to curb 
payday loan rollovers. This seems reasonable in light of evidence from 
Colorado that such measures may be somewhat successful in curbing pay-
day loans. Nonetheless, some argue that restrictions on rollovers leave gaps 
and may lead to more same-day-as-payoff transactions. Furthermore, such 
regulations to date have not addressed the demographics of payday loan 
users, and the impact of payday loans on women and children.291
At the same time, it is unclear that attempted limits on rollovers and 
added disclosures alone would protect women and their families, or all 
consumers, from the perils of payday loans. Professor Mann at Columbia 
Law School found in his study that most payday loan borrowers are fairly 
accurate in predicting their repayment and do not expect that they will re-
pay the loan by the end of the first loan term.292 Families and women in 
particular, desperate to care for their children, will take out payday loans at 
any cost, even when they know the costs are exorbitant. They also will seek 
needed funds elsewhere if unable to roll over their payday loans.
288. See Mann, supra note 73, at 3-6.
289. See Schmitz, Legislating in the Light, supra note 252, at 165-72 (proposing simple disclo-
sures for arbitration clauses).
290. Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender”—A Proposal for Candid Predatory 
Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 933-72 (2012) (detailing his intriguing pro-
posal).
291. See Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV.
979, at 1023-47 (2012) (noting inadequacies of payday loan regulations, but concluding that payday 
loans can “carry borrowers through short-term financial shocks”).
292. See Mann, supra note 73, at 4-6, 18-33 (finding race and gender had little impact on accuracy 
of repayment predictions, and that roughly 60% of borrowers predicted the final repayment within a 14-
day window).
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Accordingly, regulations should go beyond the usual disclosures and 
limits on rollovers. They should be crafted in light of more contextual anal-
ysis and take into account broader considerations of the human proclivities 
and financial problems that push consumers to desperately seek short-term 
loans.293 As the FDIC has noted, there is need for deeper consideration of 
how payday lending may harm communities as a whole:
[Q]uestionable payday lending practices, while not specifically prohibit-
ed by law, may be inconsistent with helping to meet the convenience and 
needs of the community. For example, payday loans to individuals who 
do not have the ability to repay, or that may result in repeated renewals 
or extensions and fee payments over a relatively short span of weeks, do 
not help to meet credit needs in a responsive manner.294
Communities should build and strengthen social safety nets and their 
commitments to communal welfare. This was noted in recent proposals to 
improve the success of the MLA in curbing predatory lending to service 
members by increasing the availability of emergency assistance from chari-
ties that serve each branch of the Services.295 Moralistic trust and commu-
nal sense of responsibility for our neighbors create social norms that breed 
honest dealings and means for assistance for those who are in need.296 One 
researcher, for example, tested the idea that social capital breeds a more 
affluent and equitable society by comparing the level of trust with the level 
of payday lending activity in the states studied using data from 2008 to 
2010.297 As hypothesized, she found that as the level of trust increased, the 
level of payday lending activity decreased, all other factors being held con-
stant.298
Admittedly, it is difficult to increase communal responsibility and 
trust. However, regulations could advance this objective by requiring pay-
day lenders to contribute to a community fund used to assist deserving 
families seeking to survive particularly tough financial times. Perhaps these 
lenders also could be required to provide customers with financial educa-
tion materials that may assist them in repaying debt quickly. Some com-
mentators also have argued that federal law should mandate that 
293. See supra Part II (discussing possible reasons for the gender divide); See also Mann, supra
note 73, at 3-6, 33-38 (highlighting how regulations should be premised on assumptions that consumers 
misperceive their ability to repay, but instead should encompass assessment of the problems with the 
social safety net).
294. Guidelines, supra note 38 (noting guidelines and best practices regarding payday lending).
295. FOX, supra note 207, at 105.
296. Alyssa Curran, Does a Weak Social Fabric Fuel the Predatory Lending Industry? The Link 
Between Payday Lending Activity and Community Trust (May 2013) (unpublished Masters of Arts in 
Applied Economics Capstone submission, Illinois State University) (on file with author).
297. Id. at 9-30.
298. Id. at 10-30.
2014] CONSIDERING GENDER IN PAYDAY LENDING POLICY 107
mainstream banks expand their current lending offerings for low-income 
individuals.299
Nonetheless, requiring banks to expand these loan offerings places 
awkward burdens on banks to expand their lending to those with limited 
means without violating rules requiring them to verify ability to repay the 
loans. Some also have questioned whether strict federal lending regulations 
and requirements backfire by leading to “harmful products or manipulation 
of regulatory loopholes.”300 For example, Arizona’s 36% rate cap on pay-
day loans left loopholes for high-cost prepaid cards, “credit service organi-
zations” that charge high fees for brokering loans from third parties beyond 
the scope of the cap, and open-ended loans that often function like payday 
loans.301
Instead, the situation warrants a creative solution. For example, Pro-
fessor Baradaran has proposed “post office banking,” which would enlist 
the post offices to enter the market currently dominated by fringe lenders. 
Through post offices, “[t]he government could step into this sector and 
offer lower costs credit options to the poor by only taking into account the 
actual cost of credit and forgoing large profit margins.”302 In this way, the 
government could increase competition and drive costs down closer to 
actual lending costs, while repurposing the failing Postal Service to meet a 
public need.303 Professor Baradaran further argues that this could be ac-
complished without adding to overloaded government regulators’ bur-
dens.304 The Post Offices already sell money orders, and such a program 
could prevent postal employees from losing jobs due to decreased demand 
and office closures. Moreover, such proposals show the type of creativity 
necessary for developing contextualized and successful policies.
Micro-financing (offering small-dollar loans aimed to boost new busi-
nesses or community projects) also has shown some promise in promoting 
communal commerce and easing need for payday loans for some borrowers 
with sufficient means to qualify for these lending programs. In Britain, 
where payday loans interest rates are as high as 4,214%, the government 
has encouraged creation of firms that specialize in micro-loans for low-
income borrowers.305 Some evidence suggests that these programs allow 
299. But see Baradaran, supra note 107, at 535 (noting that such requirements may “inevitably 
lead to inadequate loans and disgruntled bankers”).
300. Id. at 536.
301. Woolston, supra note 73, at 877-80.
302. Id. at 545.
303. Id. at 545.
304. Id. at 544.
305. Insley, supra note 63.
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borrowers to avoid higher cost lending products and that these borrowers 
tend to pay back the loans on time.306
Nonetheless, these lenders require more robust credit checks than typ-
ical payday lenders and charge an APR of 69.5%.307 Rates may be lower, 
however, if these micro-loans were offered through non-profit organiza-
tions, such as Kiva, which works with microfinance institutions around the 
world to promote local business and provide loans to people who do not 
have access to traditional banking systems.308 Furthermore, more micro-
financing programs could be developed specifically to boost communal 
businesses and projects developed by struggling single mothers and other 
low-income women.309
Group-based lending also may encourage responsible borrowing and 
financial literacy. For example, researchers studied the advantages that 
women have in rural Bangladesh by participating in group-based lending 
programs in which each group member receives an individual loan.310 So-
cial pressures promote repayment because the entire group loses the line of 
credit if any member defaults, while the group dynamic also encourages 
financial literacy among the group.311 Furthermore, this team-centered 
approach eases social stigmas, therefore adding to benefits for women 
seeking to gain financial strength.312 Such lending models could be offered 
306. Nitin Bhatt & Shui-Yan Tang, Determinants of Repayment in Microcredit: Evidence from 
Programs in the United States, 26 INT’L J. URBAN & REGIONAL RESEARCH 360, 360-61 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.26438/18141_Determinants_of_Rep
ayment_in_Microcredit.pdf (suggesting that “the strongest appeal of microcredit is the well-known 
success of some third-world programs in achieving high repayment records”).
307. Insley, supra note 63.
308. About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). Since Kiva was found-
ed in 2005, there have been 989,267 Kiva lenders. $472,452,650 has been provided in loans and the 
repayment rate is 98.76%. Kiva has also received the highest ratings on Charity Navigator. Kiva,
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=12978
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
309. Some micro-financing projects do seek to boost women’s business endeavors. Furthermore, 
there are grant programs aimed to assist women, in particular. For example, Wal-Mart has partnered 
with a global non-profit, Enactus, in a project aimed to empower female entrepreneurs. This Women’s
Economic Empowerment Project has been criticized by some as merely part of a public relations cam-
paign to combat Wal-Mart’s image problems in the wake of sex-discrimination lawsuits, but the project 
has provided hundreds of women with workforce training and assistance in creating new businesses or 
strengthening existing businesses in the United States alone. Program Overview, WOMEN’S ECONOMIC 
EMPOWERMENT PROJECT PARTNERSHIP, http://www.walmartempowerswomen.org/overview/ (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2013).
310. Mark M. Pitt & Shahidur R. Khandker, The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor 
Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?, 106 J. POL. ECON. 958, 959
(1998).
311. Id. at 962.
312. Id. at 957-63 (focusing more on group dynamics than proven statistics).
2014] CONSIDERING GENDER IN PAYDAY LENDING POLICY 109
on the Internet, given that they are properly administered and monitored to 
ensure safety, legitimacy, and best practices.
In Britain, Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury, encouraged 
credit unions to use church facilities and their parishioners to assist them in 
providing alternatives to payday loans offered through “church halls and 
other properties.”313 The church also plans an in-house credit union for 
members of its clergy so that it can build its own knowledge of how the 
lending process works. These proposed Church of England actions took 
place before the payday lending responsibility summit, but have gained 
traction in the wake of summit media coverage.314 They come with their 
own controversies and drawbacks, but may provide the type of familiarity 
that some borrowers crave in seeking payday loans from storefront lenders 
in their neighborhoods.
Expansion of payday lending alternatives is important for aiding indi-
viduals to break free from debt and qualify for loans at reasonable rates. 
The CFPB also could encourage lenders’ best practices by issuing guide-
lines and bolstering consumer education initiatives through social media.315
Professor Johnson has proposed that the CFPB could run a contest for the 
creation of consumer-generated advertising for its initiatives, and utilize 
crowdsourcing to select the best advertisements.316 She also has suggested 
that smartphone application technology could be used to develop an easy 
way for consumers to find affordable, low-cost loans.317
Targeted financial resources could augment consumer awareness and 
understanding of credit programs and alternatives to high-cost and risky 
fringe lending. However, this is not a call for more general financial educa-
tion. Such programs already exist, and the extent of their efficacy is un-
clear.318 Nonetheless, more refined resources regarding payday loans may 
have some impact.319 Mpowered, for example, offers free debt manage-
ment, credit education, and bankruptcy counseling in Denver, Colorado 




315. Johnson, supra note 214, at 680-715.
316. Id. at 720.
317. Id. at 724.
318. See Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial 
Literacy Education, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 421-34 (2009) (critiquing studies supporting efficacy 
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319. See id. at 427-34 (noting optimism regarding fine-tuned and supplemental education despite 
critiques of generalized financial education).
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Springs, and across Colorado.320 Currently, the program does not address 
payday and fringe lending, or needs of women in particular. However, it 
does collaborate with twenty-two of the world’s largest foundations and 
financial institutions and the program could be refined to add such re-
sources.321
Programs directed toward women’s financial issues have already de-
veloped and could be expanded to cover fringe lending. For example, the 
Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor collaborated with Texas 
AgriLife Extension Service out of Texas A&M to create Wi$eUp soft-
ware.322 The Wi$eUp curriculum has eight modules: Money for Life, 
Money Math, Money Basics, Credit in a Money World, Savings Basics, 
Insurance & Risk Management, Becoming an Investor, and Achieving 
Financial Security.323 The software includes interactive components, and 
covers things like budgeting, understanding credit in the real world, and 
seeking trustworthy assistance. Such resources may not specifically curb 
fringe lending, but they at least provide resources made for women and 
could be expanded to address payday loans.324
These are merely initial ideas to open the conversation about how pol-
icymakers should think beyond the usual interest rate caps and disclosure 
regulations to create contextualized policies. Moreover, the ultimate goal 
for contextualized policymaking should be to help alleviate demand for 
payday loans by assisting individuals out of poverty and into the middle 
class. Individuals need means to escape reliance on payday loans that are 
not merely additional mechanisms for borrowing. Swapping payday loans 
for other loans is not an enduring solution.
Expansion of credit options should be coupled with augmented educa-
tional and housing programs. For example, some communities have created 
joint high school/trade school programs that allow students to get Associ-
320. What We Do, MPOWERED, http://www.mpoweredcolorado.org/About-Us/What-We-Do.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2013); DOSP Collaboratives—Financial Empowerment Centers, DENVER OFFICE 
OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS, http://www.denvergov.org/strategicpartnerships/DenverOfficeof
StrategicPartnerships/PartnershipsConnections/DOSPCollaboratives/FinancialEmpowermentCenters/
tabid/436573/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
321. Who We Are, LIVING CITIES, http://www.livingcities.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2013).
322. About Wi$eUp, WI$EUP, http://wiseupwomen.tamu.edu/about-us.php (last visited Oct. 6, 
2013).
323. Welcome to Wi$eUp!, WI$EUP, http://wiseupwomen.tamu.edu/index.php (last visited Oct. 6, 
2013).
324. Id. See also About Us, WISER, http://www.wiserwomen.org/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) 
(Wiser is a similar program, but is a non-profit that does cover financial assistance in urgent situations); 
WISER’s “Too Good To Be True” Checklist, WISER, https://www.wiserwomen.org/index.php?id=147
(last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
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ate’s degrees, and thus gainful employment, after only one year at commu-
nity colleges.325 Some communities also have crafted rent subsidies for 
single mothers working to attain college diplomas, and credit union pro-
grams to help immigrants gain access to loans and establish credit.326
Of course, the creation of such programs is not a new concept and 
many such programs do exist. Furthermore, programs should help not only 
women—but also all individuals and families that are struggling to survive 
financially. Policymakers also should publicize these programs to increase 
consumers’ awareness and access to much-needed assistance. These are but 
a few suggestions and are only a drop in the bucket of the ideas that may 
lead to broader, more encompassing strategies. Policymakers should aim to 
not only help alleviate need for payday loans, but also create contextualized 
programs that would benefit society as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Payday lending may provide a safety net for some consumers in need 
of quick cash for emergencies. However, data suggest that most payday 
loan borrowers become repeat users caught in a cycle of high-cost debt. 
Indeed, the federal government has severely restricted these loans to mili-
tary members under the MLA as a matter of national security. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence indicates consistent overrepresentation of women, in-
cluding many single mothers, among payday loan borrowers. This takes a 
toll on not only these women and their families, but also society as a whole.
Many states already have restricted payday lending to various degrees 
and in different ways and the CFPB is poised to tackle the payday loan 
issue at the federal level. Some have suggested that the federal government 
should set a mandatory 36% rate cap on payday loans for all consumers 
like it has set for military, or at least increase disclosure requirements and 
impose roll-over limits on these loans. However, it is unclear that such 
measures will address women’s greater reliance on payday loans or bolster 
the social safety net overall. It is thus time to think creatively and consider 
contextualized programs that aim to increase women’s (and all consumers’) 
safe borrowing options, provide education regarding those options, and 
325. Sophie Quinton, Five Cool Innovations to Lift Workers into the Middle Class, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL (April 25, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-economy/solutions-bank/five-cool-
innovations-to-lift-workers-into-the-middle-class-20130425.
326. See id.
112 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
ultimately assist them in escaping cycles of debt and poverty. This article 
seeks to open the dialogue regarding such contextualized policymaking.327
327. Specific parameters and proposals regarding such lending programs are beyond the scope of 
this article. Instead, it seeks to shed light on the data in order to advance the conversation.
